Vail, Leroy and Landeg, White
Capitalism and Colonialism in Mozambique.
London: Heinemann, 1980.

to Quelimane and with British warships in the Mozambique Channel, the traders of Quelimane and Sena 'began to seek other employment for their slaves' in growing rice and corn for export to Moçambique Island and Lisbon or in collecting beeswax, ivory and timber.[114] But this partial, localized reversion to the old *prazo* economy was short-lived. As new demands for slaves arose in the 1850s, new sources of supply, both on the north bank of the Zambezi and in the Shire valley, became available.

In 1853 Galdino Faustino de Sousa, one of the Sena traders, crossed the Zambezi in search of slaves and, having killed Maruma, one of the Lolo sub-chiefs, appropriated the hitherto independent Lolo territory and built a stockade at Chamo.[115] In a sense this constituted the first solid Portuguese claim to the lands 'this side and beyond Morumbala mountain', an area destined to be pivotal in the growing slave traffic. Before he died in 1854, the year of the *prazo* reforms, de Sousa's claim to the area 'by right of conquest ... for my life and my descendants' had been officially approved, and he had shown his loyalty by contributing a contingent of his private army to the expedition against Massangano. On his death the Chamo stockade passed into the hands of his son-in-law Paul Marianno Vas dos Anjos II. The Vas dos Anjos family had arrived from Goa three decades earlier, gaining possession of *Prazo* Luabo in 1825. The *prazo* was held by Caetano Camillo Vas dos Anjos, but his brother, a colonel of the militia, Paul Marianno I, lived at Maruro on the border between the *prazo* and Lolo territory. It was this man's son, Paul Marianno II, who inherited the stockade at Chamo and the army of *achikunda*, part of which originally came from Luabo and which had been reinforced by purchases of slaves in Nsenga country.[116] He became popularly known as Matekenya, 'the causer of trembling'.[117] This nickname, derived from the Mang'anja verb *kutekenya*, 'to make shake', is eloquent of the terror that his activities inspired. James Stewart noted a song from the south bank, near Sena: 'Pack up your goods and flee! Matekenya is coming!'[118] Other members of Livingstone's expedition, who were initially inclined to sympathize with him as a 'black' rebel against the despised Portuguese, were horror-struck at the sight which greeted them constantly, from the Zambezi delta to Sena, and from the mouth of the Shire to the Ruo river, of villagers fleeing from his raiding parties.

Matekenya, however, together with his brother-in-law Jose da Cruz, brought a new sophistication to the business of slave trading, over which, by the late 1850s, the two men exercised a *de facto* local monopoly.[119] They were taking advantage of the renewed demand for slaves, this time in the Indian Ocean basin. Following upon the Revolution of 1848 in France, complete emancipation of slaves was declared in all French territories. The sugar island of Réunion (formerly Bourbon) suddenly faced the same crisis its neighbour Mauritius had faced when Britain abolished slavery in 1834. The Mauritian sugar planters, most of whose slaves had been imported from Mozambique, had been compensated with over £2 million for the 66 343 slaves that were freed.[120]

With this handsome sum, the planters expanded production and recruited 'coolie' labour from British India to replace the blacks who were now unwilling to work for wages on the plantations. By 1842 a system had been developed that specified that the workers would be recruited for five-year contracts by government officials, would be allowed to take their wives with them, to select their employers on arrival, and to leave at their own expense at any time or be repatriated after their term of indenture.[121]

For the French planters on Réunion, however, no such solution to their labour problems was possible. The French possessions in India at Karikal and Pondicherry were too small to supply the large numbers required to meet Réunion's demands, and until 1860 the French were not permitted to recruit in British India, and then only at the rate of 6000 annually. As a result the Indian labour force in Réunion stabilized at about 36000, most of whom were smuggled from British India through French territory.[122] For the Réunion plantations, now being reorganized and rationalized by metropolitan capitalists,[123] this number was wholly inadequate and it was decided to turn once again to East Africa, the traditional source of labour, but under new conditions. Ships began calling illegally at Mozambique ports as early as 1848 to purchase 'free labourers', or *engagés*, for between £2 and £2.80 each, to be resold at Réunion for £8. As sugar prices rose in the 1850s the Mozambique authorities were persuaded to sanction what was already happening.[124]

The first French ships began calling at Quelimane in 1854 and by 1858 the system had proved itself to be more profitable to the local vendors than the 1840s' trade had been. In theory it was a wholly voluntary labour system, largely modelled on the British indentured labour scheme. In practice, given the circumstances in Mozambique, it could only give fresh stimulus to the old slave trade system. When the scheme reached Quelimane in 1854 there was a temporary surplus of slaves in the barracoons due to the slackening in the Brazilian trade which had, as of 1853, ceased. By 1858 when the price of a 'free labourer' had risen to between £6 and £8 and the resale price in Réunion had reached between £20 and £28, the demand for *engagé* labour, coupled with the readiness of Cuban slavers to outbid the French agents by offering up to £14 per slave, had led to a revival of all the old methods. Slaves were collected in the interior, marched to the coast in shackles and then taken on board the French vessels after a farcical ceremony of recruitment which consisted of the slaves being asked in unknown Swahili if they had any objections to being taken to Réunion. The French government's agent made a formal declaration that he had heard nothing to suggest that they were unwilling to go, and the appropriate fees were paid.[125] Alternatively the slaves might be shipped in dhows to St Augustine Bay or Bojanna Bay on the west coast of Madagascar, depots for *engagés*, and there undergo the recruitment ceremony.[126]

On arrival in Réunion the labourers were vaccinated, quarantined

> who hadn't got relatives, when this person comes, the *mfumo* will say, What's the matter? and this person will say that he hasn't got a family and that he wants to stay with *mfumo*, and the *mfumo* will take him and call his other sons and say to them, This is your new brother. This one has no father, he has no mother, so now he is becoming your brother.[191]

The last sentence of this testimony is a remarkable echo of the song about Senhora Mariya with which this chapter began.

But this is also the context in which Manuel de Lima Vianna, who admitted having sent twelve cargoes of slaves to Brazil, could indignantly deny that he had ever 'torn slaves away from their homes', insisting that he had only captured *brutos de mato*, 'savages from the bush'.[192] The range of patronage had shrunk with the decay of the *prazos*, and the system showed a capacity to repeat itself on smaller and smaller scale. At the opposite extreme from da Cruz at Massangano, to whose *arringa* the Africans in the 1860s were 'flocking for food',[193] is the example of Chibante or 'John Scissors', the pilot of the Zambezi Expedition. Chibante had sold himself to Major Tito Sicard, a 'notoriously kind master', for three thirty-yard pieces of cloth. With two of these he purchased a man, woman and child for his own use. Lent by Sicard to Livingstone's party, he traded with the Mang'anja, on one occasion obtaining twelve iron hoes in return for a piece of coverlet given him when he had a cough. In 1862, he was paid off at the Shire mouth along with the other crew men, and by January 1863 he was settled in a village near Mazaro where he owned a large canoe with a crew of slaves, and was in the business of transporting ivory along the Kwakwa river to Quelimane.[194]

The situation was duplicated on the *prazos*, where, as Livingstone commented, the Portuguese lived by sending 'out their slaves in marauding parties to plunder whatever they can'.[195] *Prazo* Luabo, for example, was described in 1869 as being divided into six districts, each with its own *mfumo*, who was in turn subject to one of two *mwanamambos* appointed by the *prazo*-holder. The *mwanamambos* heard judicial cases referred to them by the *mfumo*, and collected the annual taxes, which they passed on in turn to the *capitão*, the *prazo*-holder's agent.[196] This system was described by Domingos, the *mwanamambo* from Congone in *Prazo* Luabo, but other sources contradict its suggestion of administrative efficiency. Thus, also in 1869, Tavares de Almeida, the commander of the expedition against Massangano, whose forces Domingos was helping to pilot up the Zambezi, complained that the *mwanamambos* were acting as independent rulers, disobeying orders that the *prazo*-holders had given them, and collecting their own personal retinues of runaway slaves.[197] Oral testimony from the villages of *Prazo* Luabo confirms these claims:

> At that time we used to pay our tax to Mwanamambo. When he arrived in an area like this, he used to build himself an *arringa* and start a war. We were all asked as a result of the war to produce bags of millet – sacks and sacks

> and sacks of it! That was the tax that we used to pay before the white men came.[198]

Ever since 1838 the Portuguese had been trying to abolish the *prazo* system. By 1870 it had collapsed from within, the *prazos* of Quelimane district disintegrating into ever-smaller units, ruled by anyone with a gun who could organize a maurauding party.

The dislocation the region experienced through sixty years of slaving, repeated famine and migration, may be illustrated in another way. Maps of Zambezia at the beginning of the nineteenth century show the Bororo and the Maravi in possession of the north bank, divided by the Shire river, and the Quiteve and the Karanga possessing the south bank. By 1880 the Zambezi valley is divided between the Nyungwes, the people of Nyungwe or Tete, the Senas, the people of Sena, and the Chuabos, the people of 'the fort' (*chuabo*) or Quelimane, with the Kololo and the Massingiri controlling the Shire valley, and the Makanga the area north of Tete. Each of these groups was a composite of *achikunda* and refugee *colonos*, swept up in the maelstrom of the slave trade and dropped here and there by it along the banks of the Zambezi and forced to redefine themselves and their relationships. There are limits to the relevance of such ethnic considerations, but the people themselves make the point:

> Here, we just say we're all Senas. We don't bother to ask people, What tribe are you? We all call ourselves Sena. But Sena isn't a tribe, it's a place.[199]

In the struggle for survival, even identity was forfeit. These were the people who could say, in 1872, 'Without a *senhor*, a black man cannot live',[200] or who could sing,

> I have no mother,
> I have no father,
> I have no mother to nurse me:
> Senhora Mariya is my mother.

Notes

1. D. and C. Livingstone, *Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and its Tributaries* (New York, 1866), 175.
2. G. L. Sulivan, *Dhow Chasing in Zanzibar Waters* (London, 1968, repr. of orig. edn of 1873), 20–1.
3. The words in ChiSena are *'Sina Mama, sina Baba, sina Mama wakulewa naye: Mamandiwe Mariya'*. For a musical transcription of 'Sina Mama', see A. Werner, *The Natives of British Central Africa* (London, 1906), 217. See also D. MacDonald, *Africana: or the Heart of Heathen Africa*, 2 vols (London, 1882), II, 50. The song was also recorded by Fred Moir, of the African Lakes Company, in a Notebook of 1881, 15 (Courtesy of Dr Hugh Macmillan). Senhora Maria is

mentioned in another song originating on the Zambezi and published as no. 6 in E. T. Chakanza, 'Nyasa Folk Songs', *African Affairs*, 49 (1950), 158–61.
4. D. Livingstone, *The Zambesi Expedition of David Livingstone*, ed. J. P. R. Wallis (London, 1956), 48, contains the first of many such references. On Senhora Maria, see J. de Azevedo Coutinho, *Memorias de um Velho Marinheiro e Soldado de Africa* (Lisbon, 1941), 113–14, and M. D. D. Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi* (London, 1973), 279.
5. Quoted in Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement*, 103. Also contributing to the lack of growth of a legally recognized group of Portuguese settlers was the fact that the sanctification of marriages could be performed only by the local – and largely corrupt – Roman Catholic priests. From their position of monopoly they charged large sums for their services from rich and poor alike. This resulted in many Portuguese and people of mixed blood living 'in a public state of concubinage rather than pay the exorbitant price of marriage'. P(ublic) R(ecord) O(ffice) ADM 1/2269, 'Ferrão's Memoir on Senna', 10 July 1810, trans. by Capt. Owen, 1823.
6. This account is summarized from Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement*, 48–69; 87–111.
7. The details of this paragraph are condensed from A. A. de Andrade, *Relações de Moçambique Setecentista* (Lisbon, 1955), a book of documents, and in particular from the accounts on pp. 225–9, 'Memoria sobre a Terra de Luabo', by M. A. de Almeida (1763), and pp. 375–405, 'Descripção de Capitania de Moçambique, suas Povoações e Producções' (1788). For rainfall figures, see R. W. Steel and R. M. Prothero, eds, *Geographers and the Tropics: Liverpool Essays* (London, 1964), 81–109.
8. M. V. Jackson Haight, *European Powers and South East Africa*, rev. edn (New York, 1967), 73–5.
9. A. N. de B. de Villas-Boas Truão, *Estastistica de Capitania dos Rios de Senna do Anno de 1806* (Lisbon, 1889), *passim*; P.R.O. ADM 1/2269, 'Ferrão's Memoir on Senna'.
10. Villas-Boas Truão, *Estastistica*, *passim*.
11. See Haight, *European Powers*, 68, and Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement*, 127, for discussions of the circumstances surrounding Villas-Boas Truão's death.
12. Haight, *European Powers*, 63–5. Duties were regarded solely as revenue-raising measures, without regard to their negative impact upon local production.
13. F. M. Bordallo, *Ensaies sobre a Estatistica das Possessões Portuguezes no Ultramar*, II series, livro IV: *Provincia de Moçambique* (Lisbon, 1859), 249–63.
14. R. J. Hammond, *Portugal and Africa, 1815–1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism* (Stanford, 1966), 20; A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal*, 2 vols (New York, 1972), II, 1–2; 61–4.
15. A. de Sousa Ribiero, *Regimen dos Prazos da Corôa* (Lourenço Marques, 1907), contains all the important legislation regarding the *prazos* in chronological order in its opening section, 'Legislação sobre os Prazos da Corôa', 7–165.
16. ibid, 15–16.
17. ibid, 16–21.
18. J. M. da Silva Cunha, *O Trabalho Indigena: Estudo de Direito Colonial*, 2nd edn (Lisbon, 1955), 132–5.
19. ibid, 137–8.
20. *B(oletim) O(ficial) do Governo de Moçambique*, no. 59 of 1859.
21. Lt F. L. Barnard, *Three Years Cruise in the Mozambique Channel* (London,

1969, repr. of 1848 edn), 18, indicates 340 troops for the whole of Quelimane, Sena, and Tete, 'consisting of convicts, mulattoes and blacks, miserably clad and worse fed'. J. Stewart, *The Zambesi Journal of James Stewart*, ed. J. P. R. Wallis (London, 1952), 40, states that there were only forty black soldiers stationed in Sena in 1862.

22. D. Livingstone, *Livingstone's African Journal*, ed. I. Schapera, 2 vols (London, 1963), II, 425.

23. A(rquivo) H(istorico) U(ltramarino), Lisbon, Cod. 1455, Interim Governor of Quelimane to Secretary-General of the Government, 13 Dec. 1876. (All A.H.U. references are from Sala 12 (Moçambique).) See also ibid, same to same, 9 Sept. 1877, in which the Interim Governor complains of having only 'forty to fifty' at his disposal.

24. E. A. Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves in East Central Africa* (London, 1975), 216–17. Professor Alpers's conclusions are based on tables published in A. F. Isaacman, *Mozambique: The Africanisation of a European Institution: The Zambesi Prazos, 1750–1902* (Madison, 1972), 88. These tables provide official figures only, and they therefore considerably understate the degree of Quelimane's commitment to the slave trade by 1821.

25. L. Bethell, *The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807–1869* (Cambridge, 1970), 6–26.

26. C. D. Rice, *The Rise and Fall of Black Slavery* (London, 1975), 269.

27. Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 216–17; Haight, *European Powers*, 63.

28. A.H.U. Maço 24, Xavier Botelho to Conde de Subserra, 25 Dec. 1825, in Francisco Santana, ed., *Documentação Avulsa Moçambicana do Arquivo Historico Ultramarino*, III (Lisbon, 1974), document 22/2. See also P.R.O. F.O. 881/2790, 'Extract from a Report by Consul Elton on the Trade and Commerce of Mozambique for the Year 1875'.

29. G. S. Graham, *Great Britain in the Indian Ocean, 1810–1850* (Oxford, 1967), 110–29, fully describes Britain's dealings with Portugal during the period. See also Rice, *Rise and Fall*, 234.

30. A. F. Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique* (London, 1976), 6, reprints from the same author's *Mozambique*, 92, a table of official statistics, now reinterpreted. See also Haight, *European Powers*, 228.

31. A.H.U. Maço 24, Xavier Botelho to Conde de Subserra, 30 Dec. 1825, in Santana, *Documentação*, document 22/3.

32. Owen to the Secretary of the Admiralty, 9 Oct. 1823, quoted in C. Lloyd, *The Navy and the Slave Trade* (London, 1968), 209.

33. Graham, *Indian Ocean*, 113.

34. Haight, *European Powers*, 227.

35. Alpers, *Ivory and Slaves*, 216–17.

36. Lt Wolf, 'Narrative of Voyages to Explore the Shores of Africa, Arabia and Madagascar', *The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, III (1833), 206.

37. P.R.O. ADM 1/5575, Memorandum of F. L. Barnard to Cunningham, 15 Aug. 1846, encl. in Dacres to Ward, 10 Nov. 1846. See also Barnard, *Three Years Cruise, passim*.

38. F. T. Texugo, *A Letter on the Slave Trade Still Carried on along the East Coast of Africa called the Province of Mozambique* (London, 1838), 14–15.

39. ibid, 14. P. G. Hill, *Fifty Days on Board a Slave Vessel in the Mozambique Channel* (New York, n.d. [1844]), 19.

40. P.R.O. F.O. 84/17, enclosure no. 5 in Hayne to Londonderry, 16 Jan. 1822.

8 Zambesia Company *cypaes* with boys' band, *c.* 1900

there received a message from some of its divided leadership offering peace and surrender if he would not impose harsh terms. He agreed and on 19 June marched his column of 6000 men into the *arringa*. The *bazo*, Repete, who had been responsible for the policy of resisting the Portuguese, was tried and he and five of the leading *kazembes* were executed. Thus the last significant centre of resistance had been overcome, and in 1899 *Prazo* Boror saw the imposition of Portuguese taxes for the first time, with the former captain of the *arringa* of Maganja da Costa, Matheus, acting as the chief of the Boror Company's police responsible for the collection.[40] In the same year *cypaes* of the Zambesia Company occupied *Prazos* Milange, Lugella and Lomwe,[41] and in 1902 Barwe and Makanga were finally subdued. Although pockets of resistance endured until at least 1906, especially in *Prazos* Lomwe and Lugella, Portuguese control was fairly secure. The way was open for the firm imposition of the company system.

The company system in the 1890s

The reforms suggested by the *Prazo* Commission of 1889 were implemented in 1892 but the government's aim of renting the *prazos* to Portuguese individuals was not achieved. In the 1880s there was a revival of that old institution, the chartered company, which was used to extend

finance capital to far-flung corners of the world. In 1881 the British had chartered the North Borneo Chartered Company, and this was followed by the Royal Niger Company in 1886, the British East Africa Company in 1887 and the British South Africa Company in 1889. The German government had likewise chartered two companies, the New Guinea Company in 1885 and the East Africa Company in 1887. The chartered company seemed to effect a marriage between capital and political administration that was particularly attractive to European governments reluctant to spend large sums of tax revenue on the conquest and administration of tropical lands. Portugal, hopeful that concessions would attract capital that would stimulate economic growth, emulated other imperial powers and, starting in the 1870s and sharply accelerating after 1885, granted a series of concessions to Portuguese nationals. By the late 1880s, however, it was obvious to the Portuguese that small or limited concessions for rights in distant parts of the colonies were ineffective in attracting capital. When these early companies failed, the government encouraged larger companies, granting them more far-reaching monopoly rights and quasi-sovereign powers to further colonial occupation and development. The first of these large companies was the Companhia de Moçambique (Mozambique Company), founded on the remains of a set of concessions granted to Colonel Paiva de Andrada in the late 1870s and 1880s. In February 1891 the government granted the reconstructed company a new charter in accordance with which the company was to possess full sovereign rights over Manica and Sofala, between the Zambezi on the north and the Sabi on the south. The charter was to be for twenty-five years, but in 1897 it was extended to fifty years' duration.[42] It was obliged to construct railways, roads and port facilities, establish schools and hospitals, settle Portuguese immigrants in the territory and generally speed economic development. The company took the form of a joint stock company and its shares could be held by anyone, regardless of nationality. To prevent the denationalization of the company, however, the government stipulated that the majority of the directors should be resident Portuguese nationals, that its headquarters should be in Lisbon, that its Statutes be subject to government review and that a Royal Commissioner could be appointed to supervise the company's policies. Non-Portuguese shareholders' interests could be represented by committees and branch offices operating outside Portugal, and the company was empowered to grant sub-concessions to non-Portuguese people and companies.[43] Soon afterwards the Portuguese government followed a similar strategy for the Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts in the far north of the colony, responding to the German seizure of the mouth of the Rovuma river in 1891, by chartering in September 1891 the Companhia do Niassa (Niassa Company).[44]

When the *prazos* of Quelimane and Tete districts were offered for rent in 1892 the great financial and political crisis through which Portugal was passing, coupled with the usual hesitancy of the Portuguese to risk capital in colonial investment, made it impossible to rent them

cleared and planted. In the dry season of 1891 the machinery from Scotland arrived and was installed and prospects for the venture appeared good.[84] But the burden of unpaid rent to the government remained and Hornung quickly ran into labour problems. Caldas Xavier had claimed that his labour system had attracted to the *prazo* a population of between 20 000 and 25 000 people, but this was probably an exaggeration for propaganda purposes and in any case was out of date. In the immediate area of Mopeia, the Massingiri rising had caused depopulation.[85] The *capitão mor* of Mopeia had persistently used forced labour for transport, especially on the overland section linking the Kwakwa river to the Zambezi, and the large Serpa Pinto expedition of 1889 had resulted in many of the remaining people being forced to act as baggage carriers for the troops, encouraging further emigration.[86] Though the drought of 1888–9 had ensured that the Mozambique Produce Company suffered no labour shortages, Hornung's return in 1890 with the right to levy three terms of *muvoco* at once was a heavy blow and emigration again accelerated.[87]

Several factors aggravated the problem. Although Hornung was eager to establish a sugar installation along the most modern lines, technology in sugar production had progressed only with respect to methods of sugar refining and there was little labour-saving equipment available for use in the actual cultivation of the cane. The land was cleared and hoed by hand, the sugar cane was planted by hand, the growing cane was weeded and fertilized by hand, and when the time of harvesting arrived, women were employed to strip the leaves from the standing cane by hand, as the practice of burning the fields prior to harvesting to destroy the trash had not yet been adopted.[88] The cutting and loading of the cane on wagons was also done by hand, and the wagons were pushed by hand to the factory. Hornung's original intention to use draught animals for transporting the cut cane was ruled out by the presence of tsetse. There were two further difficulties. First, it was one of the prime factors of profitability that the sugar cane should be grown on as large a scale as possible, and the immense labour input this demanded was all the more pressing at the start of the plantation, when everything had to begin from scratch. Thus, for example, in March 1891, when the plantations were still being prepared and when no crop was as yet being harvested, 3418 men and 1292 children were being employed as clearers, ditchers and planters.[89] Yet once the three-year backlog of *muvoco* had been worked off, Hornung could legally demand only two weeks' labour annually from the much diminished population, and he had to replace his entire labour force fortnightly. Secondly, the methods used by the first overseer to inculcate a near-military discipline further alienated the labour force:

Shamwale ngawona!
O [illegible]
Shamwale ngawona!
O [illegible]

Shamwale ngawona!
O – ay – ay – ay
Shi!
Yalu!
Shamwale ngawona!
Shi!
Yalu![90]

Shamwale ngawona means 'My friend, look at this!', and was the name given to the four-pronged hoe introduced by the company in 1890 for planting the first cane; *Shi* and *Yalu* are ideophones, expressing the sound of the hoe piercing the earth and of the soil being turned over. The point of the song, however, lies in its rhythm, the workers being forced to stand in regimented lines, performing set movements to numbers chanted by the overseers. No one who had worked once for the company was eager to repeat the experience.

Hornung's response to the labour shortage was to try to increase the area from which he might draw his labour. Almost immediately he subleased two neighbouring sections of *Prazo* Mahindo from its proprietor Correia & Carvalho, paying an annual rental of 1 500 000 *reis* for labour and cultivation rights.[91] Also in 1890 he attempted to extend the boundary of his own *prazo* to include the Morumbala area, but this attempt was frustrated when the Portuguese government, in payment of a debt, granted *Prazo* Massingiri, including Morumbala mountain, and *Prazo* Maganja d'alem Chire to the German explorer and trader Carl Wiese.[92] Three years later the Governor of Quelimane had to intervene in a quarrel between Hornung and Wiese over the boundaries of their *prazos* which had led to some villages of *Prazo* Massingiri being taxed twice over; the boundary was fixed in Wiese's favour and Hornung benefited only in that one possible escape route from his *prazo* was now effectively sealed.[93] In February 1894 another escape route was cut off when Hornung successfully petitioned the governor that certain islands in the Zambezi, ostensibly belonging to the Mozambique Company, in fact belonged to the north bank and to his *prazo*. Geographically, Hornung was correct, the official maps being again out of date, but the point of the manœuvre was that these islands, lying close to the villages of Murriwa, Cocorico, Zanha and Inhacatundu which furnished the bulk of the company's labour, had 'for some years served as a refuge for those natives who sought to evade work'.[94] At the same time the Minister for the Colonies suppressed the office of *capitão-mor* in Mopeia, giving Hornung undisputed authority in his *prazo* and an uncontested monopoly of its labour.[95] These changes, however, could only have limited effect so long as adjacent areas, such as *Prazos* Luabo, Goma and Mugovu or the whole south bank territory, were wholly or partly beyond Portuguese control. In 1895, for example, the British Vice-Consul at Quelimane wrote that the people were 'fast leaving for the south side of the river, and other places . . . owing . . . to being able to escape payment of taxes'.[96]

international finance capital, was peculiarly vulnerable to events beyond her borders as 1890–1 was to show.[104]

Because of a revolution in Argentina, Argentine bonds, *cedulas*, plummeted in value. One of the major holders of *cedulas* was the important London banking house of Baring Brothers, and with the decline of *cedulas*, the bank needed to find quick liquidity. Thus it called in many of its bills of credit, including some £700 000 in short-term credits to Portugal.[105] Meanwhile, a revolution in Brazil had caused a decline in remittances to Portugal from settlers in Brazil from a normal £1 million annually to some £200 000 in 1890. These remittances had always been a source of hard currency which Portugal could use to meet international obligations, and their decline left Lisbon unable to pay Baring Brothers. Instead, Portugal was forced to use her gold reserves, causing in turn a shortage of gold in the Bank of Portugal, and in May 1891 the bank was authorized not to redeem its note issue in gold. In July this inconvertibility was made permanent. In a speedy manifestation of Gresham's Law gold and silver coinage disappeared into private hoarding or was exported from the country, exports of such coin in 1891 being estimated at £5 570 000 worth.[106] Since metallic coinage comprised 84 per cent of the total money in circulation, the disappearance of silver and gold produced a monetary crisis, putting an end to the policy of *Fontismo* just at the moment when the ultimatum had ended Portugal's political stability.[107]

In turn this crisis precipitated the collapse of the Banco Lusitano, the bankers and one of the main backers of the Mozambique Sugar Company. The bank's failure meant that shares held by the bank were useless to the company, while cheques written by the company were dishonoured. While these shares, and shares belonging to others hit by the crisis, were being refloated, work in Mopeia was suspended and the entire production for 1891 was lost. Staff were retrenched, and those remaining resigned themselves 'to being exposed to the effects of an atrocious climate, where microbes are the ruling masters and where poisonous vapours hold sway'.[108] Planting, though, continued amidst the microbes and the vapours, and with Hornung himself setting an example by accepting a 75 per cent salary reduction until sugar was actually produced, and with the government granting a moratorium on the unpaid rental, the company survived the crisis.[109] At this point, for the second time, Hornung proved lucky. Sugar prices on the world market had continued their decline, falling from 13s per cwt in 1890 to only 10s by 1895, but the company was not restricted to producing sugar.[110] From sugar cane one could also distil alcohol, and in the Mozambique of the 1890s this was an eminently profitable commodity.

Alcohol had long been an item of commerce in Central Africa, first being used in exchange for such commodities as rubber, ivory and slaves. With the expansion of trading in the 1870s and 1880s in Quelimane district alcohol became fundamental to the exchange economy of the area, representing as it did the one commodity in which the resident *prazo*-holders could compete successfully with the itinerant Indian

merchants.[111] By manufacturing it themselves from their tiny plots of sugar cane or coconut palms, or by levying as tribute the potent spirit brewed from the fruit of the cashew tree, still known from that tree's name throughout Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia as *kachasu*, the *prazo*-holders could supply a product more insidiously tempting than cloth and hoes. It was this trade that first Correia & Carvalho, then the Mozambique Sugar Company, then the Zambesia Company, then the Luabo Company, and finally the Boror Company, inherited and expanded. Thus, in its first year of production, the sugar company made not only 600 tons of sugar but also 47 000 litres of alcohol.[112] This was sold at Quelimane, entering a trade system that extended far inland. In 1892, for example, William Churchill, the British Consul at Moçambique Island, reported that large amounts of alcohol were shipped from Quelimane to Tete where, together with guns and powder, they were traded for slaves who, in turn, were traded farther upstream for ivory, and Crawford Angus, an agent of the North Charterland Exploration Company, later reported the continuance of this trade.[113] Today, oral traditions from the area still remember Hornung's company primarily as a manufacturer of *kachasu*.[114]

Alcohol, however, was by no means confined to the local market. In 1875 Portugal and the Transvaal had concluded a Treaty of Commerce following upon the award of Delagoa Bay to Portugal. This treaty included the specifications of a railway to be built from the bay to the Transvaal and it stated that goods from Mozambique or manufactured in Mozambique could be exported to the Transvaal free of all duty. The treaty was ratified in 1882 and was to run for twenty years. When the great gold mines of the Rand were established, employing tens of thousands of labourers, both white and black, this clause opened up an enormous market in rotgut alcohol to distillers in Mozambique. The alcohol, often heavily adulterated with poisonous amylic alcohol, was purchased by large Transvaal firms which either resold it to smaller bottling companies or blended and bottled it themselves for sale to the work-force.[115] One brand, 'Kaffir Brandy', for example, was made to an intriguing formula which called for fifteen gallons of Mozambique alcohol, fifteen gallons of water, one gallon of tincture of cayenne pepper, a half pound of mashed prunes, one and a half ounces of sulphuric acid, and one ounce of nitric ether, all coloured with caramel.[116] Almost 200 000 litres of raw alcohol entered the Transvaal from Mozambique in 1894, the total climbing to 517 790 litres in 1896.[117]

Most of this alcohol was supplied by Hornung, who contacted the Lourenço Marques firm of Joost, Gubler & Co. to arrange transshipment to the Transvaal.[118] In 1896, the year after the Delagoa Bay railway opened, production at the Mopeia distillery reached 365 811 litres, and Hornung had to import sugar from Natal when his own plantations could not keep pace with demand.[119] Profits in 1896 were 56 943 000 *reis*, rising to 92 741 000 *reis* in 1898, and it was this river of raw alcohol, three times as profitable as sugar, which kept the company afloat during the years of depressed sugar prices.[120] The boom

for the Rand mines and with the Mozambique and Niassa companies' areas otherwise committed the most accessible remaining area for recruitment was Quelimane district. In 1906, therefore, Francisco Mantero, the controller of the largest of São Thomé's cacao companies, the Companhia da Ilha do Principe, decided to secure his own personal labour supply from Mozambique. He joined with the Zambesia Company's agent in *Prazo* Lugella, Carlos Masetti, and with a former naval officer who had served with Azevedo Coutinho, Pedro Gusmão, to form the new Empresa Agricola de Lugella (Lugella Company), based on *Prazos* Milange, Lugella, and Lomwe, which it sub-leased from the Zambesia Company.[73] These three *prazos* were not agriculturally promising because of transport problems, the presence of tsetse, and persistent resistance by the people to company rule.[74] Yet their isolation and dense population made them ideal for the methods of compulsory recruitment the company intended to use. In addition labour was also made available to São Thomé from other of the Zambesia Company's *prazos* and from state-administered territories. In 1908 an initial 150 *serviçaes* were exported, followed by 1200 in 1909, of which Mantero acquired 900.[75] In effect, the *prazos* were witnessing a throw-back to the nineteenth century's *engagé* trade, and in the years after 1909 an estimated 10 000 to 15 000 people – women included – were sent from Zambezia to São Thomé.[76] The recruitment was done under the authorization of local governors who had the right to permit recruitment without reference to Lourenço Marques.[77] The Governor-General of Mozambique after 1906, Alfredo Freire d'Andrade, considered that the recruitment for the crucial São Thomé cacao industry was 'specially justifiable' in spite of any injuries to Zambezian agriculture, as São Thomé was a 'valuable Portuguese colony'.[78]

The African response

By 1910 company dissatisfaction with the *prazo* system was mounting. The companies were not getting sufficient workers either to expand existing plantations or to develop their new interest in sisal, yet the system permitted labour to be exported from Quelimane district to São Thomé and the Transvaal. On the face of things, however, there seemed no good reason why labour should be in short supply. In 1912, for instance, *Prazos* Maganja aquem Chire, Luabo and Marral, had a combined population of 49 223, including 13 143 men, while *Prazos* Boror, Licungo, Nameduro, Macuse and Tirre contained 74 742 people, including 17 055 men.[79] Given the fact that the 1899 labour code had made work compulsory, and that it had left the actual period of work to be determined locally, these numbers should have provided Hornung's sugar and Boror's coconut plantations with ample supplies of labour, had the companies been able to persuade or compel the people to work for them for long periods. The ultimate weakness of the *prazo* system as a system of private labour pools was that it assumed an

acquiescent population. In practice, the people were successful in limiting the demands made upon them to a point at which the system itself broke down.

There is a sense in which, so far as the African populations of the *prazos* were concerned, the *prazo* system came to an end in the 1890s with the arrival of the capitalist companies. Until then, along the Zambezi and in the immediate vicinity of Quelimane, the patron–client relationship between *prazo*-holder and *colono* had retained something of its original validity. The slave raiding of most of the nineteenth century had reduced the system's scale, modifying it to a system of *arringas*, which themselves lost pre-eminence as the slave trade died away, and as peasant agriculture flourished in the 1880s. Yet one effect of the opportunities for profit from oilseeds and copra was to strengthen the system of domestic slavery, and among the ordinary people the habit persisted of attaching oneself to a *muzungu*, who may have been a trader, company official or small planter. Several of the Sena or Chuabo songs which exist from this period are addressed to a *patrão*, much in the spirit of the song to Senhora Mariya quoted on the initial page of Chapter 1. Romão de Jesus Maria, for example, returning by canoe to *Prazo* Marral some time in the 1890s, was hailed by his canoemen as follows:[80]

Muzungo Romão has arrived
e – e
and is going to Marral
e – e

Muzungo Romão ofia
e – e
no Marral odoa
e – e

while 'Jemwe', the Portuguese representative at Maruro of Joaquim de Paiva Andrada, the holder of *Prazo* Luabo, was the subject of several admiring songs sung by canoemen on the Kwakwa river:[81]

Jemwe, Jemwe, Jemwe
Jemwe is the great one
Wo, wo – o – o
Jemwe,
Wo, wo – o – o

Jemwe, Jemwe, Jemwe
Jemwe ndinkandanwisa
Wo, wo – o – o
Jemwe,
Wo, wo – o – o

With the arrival of the plantation companies during the 1890s this relationship was undermined. Although the intention of Ennes's 1892 regulations was that the new *prazo*-holders should continue to accept responsibility for the welfare of the populations of their *prazos*, the companies were interested only in the large supplies of cheap labour. From the point of the local people the system had been shattered. Suddenly labour was being levied in quantities never before experienced and put to work on tasks which were utterly unfamiliar. The song *Shamwale Ngawona* ('My friend, look at this!') quoted in Chapter 3, expresses something of the sense of astonishment with which Africans at Mopeia in the early 1890s responded to the labour levies and to the quasi-military

routine of cultivation. Even more revealing is a song addressed to the new *prazo*-holder, José de Paiva Raposo, Hornung's brother-in-law, on whose concession the Mozambique Sugar Company was established:[82]

Paiva – ay
Wo – o – o, wo
Paiva – ay
Wo – o – o, wo
Paiva – ay
Paiva, I've killed his money for him,
His penis!

Paiva – ay
Wo – o – o, wo
Paiva – ay
Wo – o – o, wo
Paiva – ay
Paiva ndampera dinyero ache
Nsondo wache!

The song, which is more effective in its original Sena than in English translation because of its accelerating rhythm and the final thumping rhyme, is interesting from several points of view. In its form – the triple enunciation of the theme followed by an epigrammatical comment – it repeats exactly the form of the canoe-songs addressed to Senhora Mariya or Jemwe. Many of the earliest worksongs sung on the plantations at Mopeia were adaptations of older canoe-songs, the rhythms being appropriate for both types of communal labour.

In its content, however, the *Paiva* song expresses a totally new idea, the idea of appropriation without reciprocity. *Ndampera*, 'I have killed for him', used here metaphorically, refers literally to hunting game, which in Sena society is governed by a set of rules specifying the just distribution of the kill. Paiva, the new *prazo*-holder, is failing in his responsibilities by demanding too much and giving too little. In voicing such criticism, the song makes use of an established form of etiquette, common to many African societies, whereby people in authority – whether chiefs, headmen, husbands, fathers, or occasionally European plantation owners – may be attacked for their behaviour in song in terms which would not be permissible in any other form. The song, in short, legitimizes the criticism. It became immensely popular, spreading quickly along the Zambezi, first from Mopeia to Caia, where Sena Sugar Factory began production in 1908, and thence downstream to Marromeu and eventually to Sena Sugar Estates' main plantations at Luabo, accumulating fresh meaning all the time as the word '*Paiva*' came to symbolize all that the company system had brought:

> This song can't be forgotten. Even our children will have to know it. Because Paiva was the one who made the people suffer. This song, whatever may happen, we have to know it. Because it's about what people suffered. All the children will have to be told of the suffering we went through here on earth, and this is the song we used to sing.[83]

We shall be following different versions of the song in subsequent chapters. What the 1890s version of it crystallizes, as an initial response

to company rule, is the sense the Africans had that the *prazo* system as they knew it had already disappeared.

The response of the Africans of *Prazo* Maganja aquem Chire to the new *prazo*-holder was what it had always been to *prazo*-holders who exceeded their rights. Where armed revolt was impossible, they fled. As noted in Chapter 3 the people of the *prazo* fled first to the islands of the Zambezi or to Mozambique Company territory, or northwards to *Prazo* Massingiri. Only as these escape routes were cut off, one by one, and as Hornung relaxed his demands by introducing steam-ploughs and by deliberately levying *mussoco* less harshly than his neighbours, did some of the people return to the *prazo*. Thus, in order to protect his labour supplies, Hornung was compelled to levy less labour than the plantations actually demanded, and to experiment with a kind of paternalism whose ultimate source was the ideas held by the people themselves of what the *prazo* system was all about.

What happened at Mopeia in the early 1890s was duplicated elsewhere in Quelimane district as the other plantation companies obtained *prazos*. The population of *Prazos* Anguaze and Andone fell from an estimated 44 000 in 1897, the year of the Zambesia Company's takeover, to 29 634 in 1898 and 9691 by 1901.[84] These figures are obviously suspect, the first being addressed to company shareholders greedy for profits from *mussoco*, the last being directed to the state eager to increase the *prazos*' rental, but they do illustrate a general trend. Maganja d'alem Chire also lost 'thousands of *colonos*' in 1898 'due to a very violent collection of mussoco', a company official later reflecting:

> with the exception of Anguaze and Andone, no *prazo* had a more unhappy start to our administration. It is certain that the violence was only typical of Zambesia at that time, but the losses have affected future managers because the natives' memory cannot be obliterated.[85]

Prazos Madal, Cheringone and Tangalane lost 7728 people from a fairly small population between 1902–5, the years when the Société du Madal was establishing its first plantations, and in 1904 an employee of the Luabo Company, enforcing *mussoco* and labour levies for the first time in *Prazo* Marral, was credited with having produced a drop in the population of 4000 in just four months! Even on *Prazo* Maganja aquem Chire, where Hornung's new paternalistic policies had been successful in attracting migrants, the expansion of the Mopeia estates in 1903 caused the population to fall from 19 439 to 12 874, as the Africans moved downstream into *Prazo* Luabo.[86] Much of this early migration seems to have been temporary, the company *prazos* recovering their populations as the Africans discovered that the new conditions were as harsh elsewhere and consequently returned home. This was especially true in the coastal *prazos* where, by 1905, the three main copra companies were exerting very similar pressures, and company complaints about the population being constantly on the move quickly subsided.

In some cases, however, the migrations were of a more permanent

of constructing and maintaining, in alien surroundings, a sense of Sena identity, acting 'as a powerful mechanism of socialization ... by the imitation of family and political relationships and the appropriate behaviour patterns'. Later, after missionaries and colonial administrators tried to ban *nomi* on the grounds of the alleged immorality of the *geros*, the societies became an important focus of resistance to colonial rule.[106]

Secondly, and even more significantly, Sena attitudes of paternalism and dependency were demonstrated in 1917 by their refusal to join the Barwe rising. The use of corvée labour for road-building and the recruitment of porters for war service (*tenga-tenga*) led the people of Manica to rise in rebellion. They were led by surviving members of the Barwe rulers, who had opposed the initial advance of the Mozambique Company, and were supported by the spirit mediums. The rising spread to the north bank and within a matter of weeks all Portuguese had been expelled from the country between Sena and Zumbo and from the east bank of the Luangwa river.[107] The people within the company *prazo* system had precisely the same reasons to revolt. In 1916, for example, inhabitants of *Prazo* Maganja d'alem Chire were taken to the south bank to build roads to Barwe and Tete, the whole population being employed 'many of them two or three times to complete the full quota in place of absentees and the aged'.[108] Similarly, in 1917, recruitment for *tenga-tenga* was equally onerous throughout the *prazos*. At Vila Bocage no less than three levies were made in the year, the people being tied up and taken away by press gangs.[109] However, in spite of the rising's spreading to Tete district, north of the Zambezi, it failed to gain support among the Sena of the company *prazos*, and lost its impetus as soon as it reached areas where plantations were being established. *Cypais* from *Prazo* Maganja aquem Chire led by Ignacio de Paiva Raposo played a crucial part in halting the Barwe advance, while in *Prazo* Angonia Ngoni warriors themselves took the initiative in protecting tobacco plantations and recruiting centres.[110]

North of the Sena *prazos*, however, the Anguru peoples of the newly created *Prazos* Milange, Lugella and Lomwe migrated in much larger numbers as the options of staying in Mozambique or emigrating to Nyasaland presented themselves in much starker terms. The people of this area had never been incorporated into the old *prazo* system, having been completely independent throughout the whole period of Portuguese rule down to the end of the nineteenth century. There was no way in which the demands of the Zambesia Company, or later of the Lugella Company, could be related to earlier systems of government. Nor had there even existed, throughout most of the area from which emigration took place, any large centralized political structures. As J. T. Last noted in 1886,

> The headman of almost every village is independent, even when he is living in the territories of another chief. Should the chief of a district wish the headman to remove his village against his will, there would probably be an appeal to arms first.[111]

Oral traditions go so far as to deny the existence, in pre-colonial times, of any systems of tribute.[112] Part of the reason for this seems to lie in the nature of the terrain. The slave-raiding of the latter half of the nineteenth century had resulted not in the creation of an *arringa* system, as on the flatlands of the Lower Zambezi, but in the proliferation of many hundreds of tiny fortified hilltop villages, each living a relatively isolated existence.[113] Only on the fringes of Anguru country, among the Ampotola people east of Lake Chirwa, or the Akokola people near Mlanje mountain, where barriers had to be erected against Chikusi's Ngoni or Matapwiri's Yao, did any more powerful figures emerge, such as Mkanyela or Ng'ong'ola or Gwirima.[114]

Thus, what the Anguru experienced was not the sudden intensification of a recognizable political and economic system, but the arrival of *Acunha*, 'the white men', with wholly unprecedented demands for labour and for *nsongo*, 'tax'. A *machila*-bearers' song, dating from the days of the Lugella Company, preserves something of the outraged astonishment with which they reacted. The song's opening line is repeated throughout the song, while the spoken commentary takes the place of the chorus:[115]

You weep, you sleep stiffly, when you are old.
O o
You weep, you sleep stiffly, when you are old.
O o

Munanlela okono muloka muluvanle
O o
Munanlela okona muloka muluvanle
O o

Pick it up quickly,
Come quickly.
The *machila* must be carried along fast.
You'll be helped now, you will.
You'll be helped in just a moment.
Here, now, you'll be helped.
Servants! Where are you, you servants?
Tell the bearers!
This group must go to help the others.
You, hurry up there!
(We'll drop it!)
White people have come to be worked for!
(Heavy white men.
(People have to work for them, that's true!)
Come quickly, come quickly!
Sweep the yard! That one! Sweep the yard!
Those white men are coming here today.

Mwakuβiheke.
Mwakuβeke.
Machira anamochimakiwa.
Munamoroliwa nyuwo.
βaβa hihano munamoroliwa.
Munamoroliwa hihanoβaβa.
Amuleki! Muruwi amuleki?
Mwalele amachilero!
Epareyo yaworole akwaya.
Mwakuβeyo wer'u!
(Kinamuriha!)

Akunya yarwele olampwa!!
(Olimela akunya.
(Anamulapwa βaliyai!)
Mwakuβiheke, mwakuβiheke!

Nvele βate, nvele βate βo!

Akunya anarwa olelo yala.

There are two voices here, that of the white man whose orders are entertainingly mimicked, and that of the *machila*-bearer, speaking satiric asides. This long song concludes as follows:

Bearer,	Machilero,
Keep your backbone steady,	Wankisa mutana,
Run!	Otimaka!
At midday we'll arrive at Mochema,	Mitiya nampiya βanaMochema,
At Mochema, at Mochema!	βanaMochema, βanaMochema!
(Hurry! I'm going to drop it.)	(Mwakuβe kinamuriha.)

Mochema was one of the stations of the Lugella Company. What is striking about the song is its mimicry of the invaders and its sense of the enormity of their demands – 'White men have come to be worked for . . . People have to work for them, that's true.'

The many thousands of Anguru, however, who chose to escape such impositions by migrating to Nyasaland, found conditions there equally harsh. An observer in 1910 noted:

> The immigrant Anguru rarely or never form communities of their own when settling in British territory, but prefer to attach themselves to prominent Yao or Anyanja chiefs, in return for whose protection they usually perform a certain amount of menial labour.

The observer claimed that they were 'not so oppressed' as the term *akapolo*, 'domestic slave', suggests but added, revealingly, that they were addicted to thieving and especially to stealing agricultural produce.[116] As a result of the massive immigration, population density increased dramatically in southern Nyasaland. By 1926, for example, the population density of Zomba district had risen to 101·2 persons per square mile, and that of Chiradzulu district to 239·1 persons, compared to a mere 12·5 persons in Central Shire district.[117] There was, in other words, less and less land available for settlement as *akapolo*.

This and the fact that they were in any case subject to the Protectorate's tax laws drove them to working on the plantations of the Shire Highlands. Local people in Nyasaland preferred to earn their tax money by emigrating to the Rand or Southern Rhodesia where wages were much higher and the working conditions no worse. As they left the Anguru arrived to take their place, and it is not too much to say that Anguru labour created the plantations of the Shire Highlands:

> The immigration of the Anguru has . . . solved this most serious problem, and without the Anguru immigration I am confident that the extension of plantations in the Shire Highlands would not have been possible, and no Europeans would have ventured to have risked capital where a labour supply was only existent when it was least required . . . The large majority of landowners have assured me that they are only too anxious to increase the numbers of Anguru immigration on their estates [sic], for, as they have expressed it, they consider these people as 'the backbone of our labour supply'.[118]

The method used to attract this labour was the so-called *thangata* system, by which immigrants earned the right to settle on white-owned land by contracting their labour as rental – by becoming, in short, the settlers' *akapolo*. Having fled the violence of the São Thomé recruiters and the Lugella Company's tax collectors, the Anguru found themselves trapped with no automatic rights of residence, denied the opportunity of more lucrative employment elsewhere, and tolerated only so long as they furnished their landlords with cheap labour in lieu of rent at the time of year when it was most required and most onerous to provide – that is, during the rainy season.

The resentments generated by the *thangata* system on the Livingstone Bruce estates at Chiradzulu were the principal cause of the Chilembwe rising of January 1915. Interpretations of this important rising have focused on the figure of its leader John Chilembwe, pastor of the Providence Industrial Mission at Mbombwe and variously presented as a spokesman of the emerging African petty-bourgeoisie in Nyasaland or as a millenarian religious fanatic.[119] The majority of Chilembwe's supporters, however, were Anguru immigrants and it was the Anguru members of Chilembwe's battalions who were responsible for all the rising's violence and, in particular, for killing the estate manager, W. L. Livingstone. An adequate consideration of the Chilembwe rising lies beyond the scope of this book but it seems appropriate to remark that so far from being an 'elitist' rising which failed because 'it had to rely on what has been called "the worst of all possible allies, the violent, vacillating lumpenproletarians" – in Nyasaland, the uprooted Nguru immigrant labourers', it should more plausibly be regarded as a revolt of the landless immigrants who found themselves without livelihood or redress and who were betrayed by confused and vacillating leadership.[120]

The rising's failure left the Anguru refugees doubly trapped and universally despised, even by the planters who continued to find their labour indispensable. The decline in the quality of their life was noted as early as 1922:

> Anguru, when freshly arrived from their own country, are industrious, cheerful and thrifty to a degree; while as regards truth and honesty, they compare very favourably . . . These good qualities they lose . . . and nowadays are represented among the idle and criminal classes to a disproportionate extent.[121]

As late as 1953, disturbances in Nyasaland were blamed by the British authorities on landless immigrants from Portuguese East Africa, and to this day in Malawi the word 'Anguru' carries overtones of abuse.

Given the situation in Nyasaland it is not surprising, therefore, that there should also have existed within Mozambique, though on a smaller scale, a counter-current of migration from *Prazos* Milange, Lomwe and Lugella eastwards into *Prazo* Boror, following the ancient trade route to the coast. In 1970, for instance, the *administrador* of the circumscription of Namacurra discovered that out of seventeen of the chieftaincies

36. *O Problema Açucareiro*, 78.
37. Archives of the Société du Madal (Madal Archives), Quelimane, Mozambique. Loose document, 'History of the Company' (1944), 1.
38. A. de Sousa Ribeiro, *Anuario de Moçambique* (Lourenço Marques, 1940), 725; A. de Sousa Ribeiro, *Regimen dos Prazos da Corôa* (Lourenço Marques, 1907), 252; J. Rodrigues, 'Palmares da Zambezia: A Société du Madal (Fearnley, Bobone & Cie.)', *Moçambique: Documentaria Trimestral*, no. 38 (1944), 68.
39. G. Stucky de Quay, *Vieux Souvenirs de Chasse au Zambeze: suivis d'une étude sur le cafres de la region de Quelimane (Zambèze), 1897–1915* (Avignon, 1928), 213.
40. M. Correia da Silva, *Relatorio sôbre as Doenças que Atacam Os Palmares No Distrito de Quelimane* (Lourenço Marques, 1918), 6.
41. ibid, 7–8.
42. ibid, 6.
43. Lupi, *Relatorio ... 1907–1909*, 76.
44. Correia da Silva, *Relatorio sôbre as Doenças*, *passim*.
45. ibid, 10.
46. O(ral) T(estimony) Group interview, Macuse, 1 Sept. 1977.
47. F. X. Ferrão de Castello Branco, 'Relatorio dos investigações a que precedeu o Secretario dos Negocios Indigenas ... de 13 Maio de 1908', *Relatorios e Informações: Annexo ao 'Boletim Oficial': Anno de 1909* (Lourenço Marques, 1909), 244.
48. ibid.
49. ibid, 223; O.T. Group interview, Macuse, 1 Sept. 1977.
50. Stucky de Quay, *Vieux Souvenirs de Chasse*, 179.
51. ibid, 213.
52. Companhia da Zambesia, *Relatorios ... 1904–1907* (Lisbon, 1905–8), *passim*.
53. Lupi, *Relatorio ... 1907–1909*, 220.
54. Companhia da Zambesia, *Relatorio ... 1907*, 2; C(ompanhia da) Z(ambesia) A(rchives), Quelimane, Mozambique. Relatorio de 1915, 'Report on the Circumscription of Shire', by James Nicol, n.d.
55. ibid; Freire d'Andrade, 'Relatorio de Uma Viagem', 15.
56. S.S.E.A. File 123, 'Companhia do Luabo', Ignacio de Paiva Raposo to the General Administrator of the Luabo Company, 29 Apr. 1918.
57. C.Z.A. Loose document, 'Relatorio de Gerencia', 1915.
58. C.Z.A. Loose document, 'Report for the Circumscription of Shire, 1915'.
59. A(rquivo do) G(overnador de) Q(uelimane), Maço 41, 1944–5, B/15/2: 'Natives Contracted for Work for Private Individuals in the Colony', Gov. of Zambezia to the Chief of the Central Department of Native Affairs, 27 Mar. 1945, with accompanying response of the Namagoa Sisal Company.
60. A.G.Q. Maço 90, Vilhena to the Director-General of the Colonies, 5 June 1912.
61. F. Carvalho, *Districto de Quelimane, Relatorio do Governador, 1911–1912* (Lourenço Marques, 1912), 141.
62. E. Lupi, *Relatorio do Governador do Districto de Quelimane, 1906–1907* (Lourenço Marques, 1907), 62.
63. ibid, 19, 75.
64. Lupi, *Relatorio ... 1907–1909*, 238, 259.
65. Lupi, *Relatorio ... 1906–1907*, 72.
66. Companhia do Boror, *Relatorio ... 1903–1904* (Lisbon, 1905), 22–3.

67. Lupi, *Relatorio ... 1907–1909*, 238.
68. F. Mantero, *Manual Labour in S. Thomé and Principe*, trans. from the Portuguese (Lisbon, 1910), 68, 74, 77.
69. R. J. Hammond, *Portugal and Africa 1850–1910: A Study in Uneconomic Imperialism* (Stanford, 1966), 316–19.
70. Quoted in J. Duffy, *Portuguese Africa* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), 162.
71. P.R.O. F.O. 367/46, Memorandum of a meeting between Cadbury and São Thomé planters, 4 Dec. 1907.
72. P.R.O. F.O. 367/285, Strong to the Admiralty, 29 Jan. 1912.
73. P.R.O. F.O. 367/234, Maugham to Grey, 28 Aug. 1911; Azevedo Coutinho, *Memorias*, 499.
74. Lupi, *Relatorio ... 1906–1907*, 75.
75. P.R.O. F.O. 367/187, misc. statistics; F.O. 367/186, Maugham to F.O., 22 Dec. 1909.
76. A. F. Isaacman, *The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique* (London, 1976), 84.
77. P.R.O. F.O. 367/186, Minute by ?, 22 June 1910.
78. Speech by A. A. Freire d'Andrade, 21 Dec. 1910, encl. in P.R.O. F.O. 367/234, Villiers to Grey, 27 Dec. 1910; Mantero, *Manual Labour*, 44.
79. Carvalho, *Relatorio ... 1911–1912*, 141.
80. F. G. de Laçerda, *Figuras e Episodias da Zambezia* (Lisbon, 1929), 10.
81. Sung by Antonio Marianno, Mopeia, 10 Sept. 1975, in Sena. A variant, '*Jemwe babandalira*', 'Jemwe went weeping', was recorded in 1976, the reference being to his having failed to shoot a buffalo.
82. For a full discussion of this song, see L. Vail and L. White, '*Paiva*: The History of a Mozambican Protest Song', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. V, no. 1 (1978).
83. O.T. Group interview, Pirira village, Luabo, 29 Oct. 1976.
84. Companhia da Zambesia, *Relatorio ... 1897* (Lisbon, 1898), 12–13; Sousa Ribeiro, *Regimen dos Prazos*, 247.
85. C.Z.A. Loose document, 'Report of the Circumscription of Shire, 1915'.
86. Sousa Ribeiro, *Regimen dos Prazos*, 229–31, 252–3, 257.
87. J. D. de Sousa e Faro, *Zambesia, 1900–1902* (Lisbon, 1903), 80.
88. Districto de Tete, *Relatorio do Governador de 1915* (Lourenço Marques, 1916), 210–11.
89. ibid.
90. Carvalho, *Relatorio ... 1911–1912*, 141.
91. Companhia do Boror, *Relatorio ... 1914–1915* (Lisbon, 1916), 5.
92. Nyasaland Protectorate, *Census of the Nyasaland Protectorate* (Zomba, 1911), *passim*; Schoffeleers, 'Nomi', 4.
93. Nyasaland Protectorate, *Census of the Nyasaland Protectorate* (Zomba, 1921), 10; Nyasaland Protectorate, *Report on the Census of 1926* (Zomba, 1926), para. 168.
94. There is great confusion as to the proper general name for the peoples living in this area because of inadequate linguistic and historical research. The term 'Anguru' as we use it here and subsequently must be taken to refer to the peoples living in the Milange, Lugella, and Lomwe areas, the western part of Alto Moloque, and northern Massingiri and Marral. In Nyasaland Protectorate, *Report on the Census of 1931* (Zomba, 1932), 15, as in L. D. Soka, *Mbiri ya Alomwe*, 2nd rev. edn (Limbe, Malawi, 1975), *passim*, these peoples are called

7 The Administration and Forced Labour, 1930–74

The Mother Country and the Colonies should ... be prepared for mutual sacrifices in order that each in turn may enjoy reciprocal benefits.

Antonio Salazar, 1936[1]

The chefe *has made many visits ... trying to persuade people that the* chefe do posto *is not 'o branco' who collects taxes but 'o amigo' who helps them in their afflictions, resolving their little problems, rendering them justice without regard to friends or enemies, giving them counsel in their manner of living and also in the way they cultivate their lands.*

Chefe do Posto, *1947*[2]

One may view the 1942 Circular as marking the state's recognition of the necessity of coming to terms with a plantation economy rapidly expanding because of wartime demands for primary agricultural goods. Although Salazar had declared that the *Estado Novo* was against 'everything which may minimize or divide or break up the family', and although he had railed against capitalism specifically for regarding workers as mere units of labour and not as full human beings,[3] when the imperatives of the colony's capitalists' labour demands became evident the *Estado Novo* abandoned its oft-stated ideological principles – and, indeed, the law itself – and moved to meet the needs of the plantation companies. It also attempted to fulfil another of Salazar's nationalist visions, that the colonies 'produce the raw material and ... sell it to the Mother Country in exchange for manufactured goods'.[4] From another point of view, however, the 1942 Circular reflected intense dissatisfaction within Mozambique, particularly at the level of the Administrators and *chefes do posto*, at the way the 1930 Labour Code had actually worked in practice. To turn from Lisbon's legislation to Mozambique's realities in the 1930s and early 1940s is to plunge back into the tangle of idealism, greed and hypocrisy which had characterized the attempts to abolish slavery in the nineteenth century. The Labour Code had largely succeeded in eliminating the abuses peculiar to the company *prazo* system, but only to replace them with those of

an earlier period. The reason for this was not simply that the economy, even with its reduced labour demands during the Depression, could not survive the abolition of forced labour. The problem, as always in Mozambique, was one of the available Portuguese manpower, its numbers and its quality. Just as the abolition of contracts of emphyteusis in 1838 and 1854 had resulted in the *prazos* passing into the possession of Zambezia's entrenched slave-traders, so in 1930 the men who acquired recruiter's licences, and who in some cases even became the new Administrators under the *Estado Novo*, were those who had already handled recruiting for the discredited *prazo* companies. By the normal processes of Portuguese reform, the very men whose methods had attracted such criticism at the League of Nations in 1926 now found their powers and prestige enormously increased.

T. A. Rebello, for example, who had administered *Prazos* Goma and Mugovu on Sena Sugar's behalf, collecting the taxes and organizing the supplies of labour that the company needed, became in 1930 the company's official recruiter for the same areas. Workers were now to be recruited at a profit to himself of £2 per worker. Within a month, Rebello had been persuaded by Tomás de Paiva Raposo, who had given up the General Managership of Sena Sugar to form his own recruiting agency for the 20 000 workers needed to build the new railway bridge spanning the Zambezi, that Rebello would find it advantageous to supply the workers to him. Like any nineteenth-century *prazo*-holder, Rebello adopted the habit of travelling his bailiwick in a spotless white *machila*, carried by six liveried *machileiros*, with parrots attached to each of its four corners.[5] The case of Ignacio de Paiva Raposo was even more startling. Ignacio, who had preceded Tomás as General Manager of Sena Sugar, had run a recruiting office for the company in Quelimane before the ending of the *prazos*. In 1931, deep in debt, he was uttering bad cheques and embezzling company money. His recruitment arrangements were 'atrocious', with recruits compelled to walk distances far in excess of those prescribed by the Labour Code, and the company desired to dispense with his rather dubious services. But Ignacio possessed the necessary contacts and the precious recruiter's licence.[6] In 1938, Johannesburg's *Sunday Express* apostrophized him as the 'uncrowned white chief of thousands of natives' and 'the highest paid man in Africa', now giving up 'fame and fortune for the domestic bliss of his home'.[7]

Tomás de Paivo Raposo later went into partnership with another of Sena Sugar's deserters, G. F. Pinto Basto, who had once been agent of authority for *Prazo* Luabo. In 1930 Pinto Basto became the official recruiter for the Zambeze and Chinde circumscriptions at an annual salary of £1000, but following the agreement of June 1934, by which Mozambique agreed to supply labour to Southern Rhodesia, he joined with Tomás to supply workers from Barwe and Tete, including the Ngoni whom Sena Sugar customarily used as cane-cutters, at the rate of 15 000 per month.[8] Pinto Basto was also fond of *machila* travel, and a song from Mopeia gleefully celebrates a time when Nyamikungula

– 'The Troublemaker' – arrived in drunken stupor to recruit new *machileiros*:[9]

Nyamikungula is drunk
ay – ay – ay
He's drunk with kachasu, he's drunk
He's drunk – ay
He's drunk with wine, he's drunk
He's drunk – ay

Nyamikungula walezera – ay
ay – ay – ay
Walezera nipa – ay walezera
Walezera – ay
Walezera vinyo – ay walezera
Walezera – ay

1st actor: Ow! Ow! Ow! I've had enough, master!
I've had enough! I've had enough!
I'll carry the *machila*,
I'll carry the *machila*, I'll carry it!
Leave me alone, master,
I've had enough, master, I've had enough!
I'll carry the *machila*.
Pinto Basto, leave me alone!
Pinto Basto: You!
Do some work!
Do some work, you!
Aren't you going to work?
1st actor: I will work, I will.
(Pinto Basto beats him)
Ow! Ow! Master!
I will work.
What's the matter with you, Nyamikungula?

The song ends with the newly recruited *machileiros* tipping Pinto Basto into the Zambezi. Sena Sugar obtained its own revenge in a far less satisfying manner. In May 1941, following investigations by Sena Sugar's recruiter in Ile, Sarmento Pimental, a circular was sent to all circumscriptions cancelling Pinto Basto's recruiter's licence. His agents had been intercepting convoys of already-contracted workers along the Nicuadala Mopeia road, and even penetrating the compounds at Luabo, promising salaries of 60.00 *esc.* per month at the Buzi sugar estates or 150.00 *esc.* in Salisbury, as against the 30.00 *esc.* per month paid at Luabo. Workers who accepted were secretly canoed to Caia, with the connivance of some of Sena Sugar's own overseers, and there they were given fresh clothing and new identity cards, before being taken by train to their new destinations.[10]

The period 1930–42 was, therefore, the heyday of the independent labour recruiters that the Labour Code had brought into being. In theory the new Administrators and *chefes do posto* were supposed to supervise their activities. In fact they could do little for a variety of reasons. It was difficult for them to match such men as Rebello, Pinto Basto, or the Paiva Raposo clan in their knowledge of the district, and only in the circumscription of Gurue, where there had been little recruit-



21a *Machila* bearers, Quelimane, *c.* 1900

21b Max Thurnheer riding *jigajiga* with his Airedale, Luabo, 1932



the whole *posto*.[71] Meanwhile the Administrators also campaigned for chiefs to be remunerated for collecting taxes and a scheme was evolved by which they retained a fixed percentage of the tax they collected. In 1950 they were also permitted to retain 40 per cent of the 25.00 *esc.* recruitment tax on all workers contracted from their own areas if they agreed to travel *without* their wives.[72] Thus, in Ile in 1951, the 372 chiefs earned a total of 322 867.00 *esc.* per month, an average salary of 873.00 *esc.* per month, of which more than half was made up of the percentage return on *imposto* collected and the percentage return on recruitment taxes.[73] The chiefs had become, in short, an arm of the administration in all its main activities: tax collection, cotton-growing and labour recruitment.

Labour recruitment in practice

On the Quelimane Governor's labour chart for 1949, the figures were divided between those circumscriptions which required labour, such as Chinde with Sena Sugar, Gurue with numerous tea estates, Lugella with Namagoa Sisal and the Madal Company's new tea estates at Tacuane, Milange with Oriental Tea and Namacurra with the Boror Company, and those which supplied it, having little or no agriculture or industry of their own. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that labour was shuttled backwards and forwards in simple obedience to the Governor's chart – that Oriental Tea, for example, used up all the labour available in Milange before applying outside to make up for local deficiencies. In practice the labour situation became enormously complex. With no regulations to govern a process which remained technically illegal, every Administrator had his own methods, so that the actual means of recruiting labour and the precise mixture of free choice and compulsion varied not only from circumscription to circumscription, but even within circumscriptions, as Administrator succeeded Administrator. This, once again, was partly a matter of bribery. Confidential testimony declares that bribery remained necessary to procure labour up to 1961, immediately prior to the International Labour Organization's investigation into forced labour in the Portuguese colonies, and Thurnheer's private notebook for 1955 records payments of 8000.00 *esc.* and 12 860.00 *esc.* as 'contribution recruiting expenses' to the Administrators of Morumbala and Milange for labour supplied to the Oriental Tea Company.[74]

But there were other more important factors determining the precise degree of compulsion exercised from one circumscription to another. Under the system by which Africans, once recruited, had a free choice of employers it proved fairly easy for Sena Sugar or the Gurue tea planters to obtain all the labour they required. Until 1950 wages at Sena Sugar were higher than the official minimum and Lomwe from Ile, for example, returned home from Luabo with few complaints about work-

ing conditions. Similarly, Gurue was a popular choice, competition between the individual planters after 1945 having in some cases reduced tasks to a mere three or four hours per day, with double allowance of clothing and meat. The problems in Gurue arose only after the recruits arrived, with labourers preferring some planters to others: they refused, for instance, except under compulsion, to work for Cha Moçambique. For the sisal plantations, however, at Namagoa, Vila Bocage, Naciaia or Malinguine, it was quite different. Most of them were situated in the intensely hot sandy plain north-west of Quelimane, with no shade whatsoever, and the plant itself was extremely painful to handle. Although all the sisal companies paid wages 10 per cent above the standard wage, Boror had to wait for ten years to open up Mocuba Sisal, where production began in 1952, being unable to obtain even the labour required to run a mechanized plantation. The reasons why are evident in Table 7.2.[75] With not a single volunteer available, Boror could run sisal plantations only by using forced labour. Worst affected of all were the Zambesia Company plantations at Vila Bocage

Table 7.2 Volunteer and contract labour, Boror Company, 1943–5

Boror labour	1943		1944		1945	
	Vol-unteer	Contract	Vol-unteer	Contract	Vol-unteer	Contract
Sisal	—	3878	—	4035	—	2876
Coconuts	2319	119	2377	305	2263	308

in the circumscription of Morumbala. Not only was sisal an unpopular crop, but contracted workers had to walk all the way from Liciro on the Milange–Quelimane road to Morumbala, a route for whose condition the company itself was historically responsible. With the possibilities of forced labour in Morumbala itself reduced by its position on the Nyasaland border, the Vila Bocage plantation was simply allowed to shut down for lack of labour in 1945 when sisal prices were rising.[76]

Yet whatever disincentives existed from company to company or crop to crop all the companies preferred to use migrant rather than local labour, even if local labour was unemployed. This was partly because migrant labour was usually cheaper and less prone to absenteeism. For example, despite the 1942 Circular, it was not until 1945 that Sena Sugar first recruited workers from Luabo and Marral on six-month contracts. Hitherto these men had worked between three months and four and a half months only, 'all attempts to recruit in lower Zambezia' resulting 'in much absenteeism'.[77] The consequence was that there tended to be much more compulsion exercised in the supplier circumscriptions – Ile, Nhamarroi, Alto Moloque, Maganja da Costa – than in the areas of the main company plantations. As the Administrator of Alto Moloque asserted in his 1945 report, in direct rebuttal to

Caetano's speech, 'the authorities will continue to have to intervene in recruitment in order to protect their good name'.[78]

Closely linked with the companies' unwillingness to put excessive pressure upon local workers was the problem of feeding their labour force. All the companies experienced chronic difficulties in obtaining the foodstuffs specified in the Labour Code, and when, by employing migrant labour, they could free local people to produce the maize, beans, groundnuts and rice they needed, they were doubly content. Sena Sugar, for example, maintained a subsidiary, the Companhia Comercio de Moçambique, to purchase peasant-produced foodstuffs, and one of its main reasons for taking out its cotton concession was to protect its local food supplies from the encroachment of other concession-holders, the women in the company's concession being required to grow maize as well as cotton. Peasant production figures in Gurue illustrate this point precisely. During the period 1937–42, when following the dismissal of the Administrator in 1934 and the resumption of tea planting in 1936, the government returned to a system of mainly local volunteer

Table 7.3 Food production in Gurue 1938–42 (tonnes)

Product	1938	1940	1942
Groundnuts	—	1	1·5
Beans	71	111	295
Cassava	249	666	805
Millet	36	48	104
Maize	108	115	414

labour, augmented with compelled contract labour from Ile, Nhamarroi, and Alto Moloque, the proportion of foodstuffs obtained from local African growers increased from 45 per cent of the total needed to fully 99.4 per cent (see Table 7.3).[79] Significantly, Gurue was not included in the cotton concession scheme. After the 1942 Circular, however, had thrown recruitment policy into reverse, with the *cypaes* rounding up workers indiscriminately, the proportion of foodstuffs obtained locally dropped sharply to 63 per cent, and maize prices jumped above the officially fixed .80 *esc.* per kg to 2.30 *esc.* Ironically, this stimulated in turn a further rise in maize production – 734 tonnes by 1945 – this factor being used by the Administrator to explain an absentee rate estimated at fully 50 per cent![80]

Absenteeism was a problem not only for the companies. For the government it took on the more troublesome aspect of migration to Nyasaland, and the degree of forced labour in each circumscription varied also in proportion to the distance of the border. Thus in Milange, adjacent to Nyasaland, compulsion had to be abandoned and peasant production encouraged long before Caetano's speech. Milange, too, was excluded from the cotton concession scheme, and as early as 1936

the administration permitted Oriental Tea to supplement its local volunteer labour force with migrant contract labourers from Nhamarroi and Massingiri North. To solve the problem of feeding them, the administration distributed seed maize, rice and groundnuts to stimulate peasant production. The response was immediate. Between 1937 and 1944, with local labour for the tea companies being recruited on a truly volunteer basis, peasant crops were purchased by Oriental Tea or by Indian middlemen in the quantities shown in Table 7.4.[81] These figures take no account of a considerable movement of crops across the border to take advantage of higher prices.[82]

The boom continued. In 1945 the Administrator commented that, besides feeding workers in Milange, a great deal of surplus food was being exported to supply the Boror and Namagoa companies.[83] Taking advantage of the Administrator of Milange's decision that local tea

Table 7.4 Surplus peasant production in Milange, 1938–44 (tonnes)

Product	1938	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944
Groundnuts	11	11	5	5	9	17	21
Rice	11	4	5	8	24	26	56
Beans	32	83	86	195	271	119	164
Cassava	38	42	96	80	166	407	108
Maize	193	698	502	922	1897	1865	1978

being exported to supply the Boror, Madal and Namagoa companies.[83] Taking advantage of the Administrator of Milange's decision that local tea estates should have first call on local production, Thurnheer instructed Grenenger to 'Buy all out for Sena Sugar', and Oriental Tea set up its own stores which, in 1950, accomplished the 'formidable task' of buying for Sena Sugar 2000 tonnes of peasant-produced maize and 350 tonnes of cassava.[84] Milange had become, in less than ten years, the biggest food producer in Quelimane district, the policy of encouraging free peasant production and of using local volunteer labour supplemented by contracted migrant workers having solved the problem of emigration. Similarly, south of Milange at Morumbala, after the closing of the Zambesia Company's sisal plantation at Vila Bocage in 1945, there was another upsurge in peasant production. The administration began distributing seed to encourage peasant agriculture, and Sena Sugar moved in as the principal buyer; once again, the response was rapid, with surplus maize production reaching 1240 tonnes in 1946 and 1715 tonnes in 1947.[85]

Far from the Nyasaland border areas, however, all along the coast from Pebane to Macuse to Quelimane to Chinde, the tension between the potential of peasant production and the demands for labour brought an increase in the rate of forced labour. In these areas, where in the 1930s the coconut-growing Boror, Zambesia and Madal companies had suspended planting new groves of palms because of the depression, the local Africans had remained more optimistic over copra's

future. Here, between 1930–40, fully 800 000 new trees were planted by the people.[86] They sold their produce both to the large copra-producing companies and to the Indian middlemen who had been allowed to re-establish themselves during the 1920s following the abolition of the *prazo* companies' monopolies.[87] In all these areas the people could readily meet their obligations to pay tax and purchase cotton clothing through the income from their coconuts. In 1944 in Macuse, for example, wages paid to Boror Company workers totalled 1 259 135.00 *esc.*, but local earnings from the sale of copra were 3 441 700.00 *esc.*, this large figure excluding sales made at local markets.[88] At this time copra realized less than 1.00 *esc.* per kg. By 1949 the price had reached 2.50 *esc.*, and the per capita average income of the inhabitants of the *posto* of Micaune was 968.45 *esc.*[89] By 1951 the price had shot up to 4.50 *esc.*[90]

Unlike maize and cassava, however, copra was not in demand locally as a staple to feed workers and hence, as a peasant alternative, it presented the administration with considerable problems. The Administrator of Chinde, for example, sympathized with those of his people who did not want to work for Sena Sugar, but none the less felt that 'they cannot be allowed to live in idleness'.[91] This preoccupation with actual wage labour, rather than ability to meet financial obligations, was consistent throughout copra areas. As in Quelimane, where workers deserted the Zambesia Company's plantations claiming 'they can live off their own trees',[92] so all along the coast it became impossible to obtain labour without considerable compulsion. In Bajone, where 150 men were sent to work on the Tete railway as 'punishment for laziness', and in Naburi, where the Africans owned 8896 coconut palms, the *chefes do posto* attacked the volunteer system as 'simply a means by which companies can engage people without going through the proper forms' or bothering with 'their obligations under the labour code'.[93] Armed with this useful judgment, they compelled all workers to submit to the prescribed processes of contractual recruitment for six months, even though the majority of them lived within walking distance of Boror's or the Sociedade Agricola de Pebane's coconut plantations, and returned home every evening to help their wives with cultivating.[94]

Finally the configuration of labour supply was far from static, and even a minor shift in policy could have considerable repercussions. In 1943, as we have seen, Sena Sugar was compelled to increase the wages of its Anguru labour at Marromeu to 40.00 *esc.* monthly. Immediately, to dispel resentment at the different wages rates between Marromeu and Luabo, Thurnheer raised Anguru wages at Luabo to 36.00 *esc.* monthly, or to 40.00 *esc.* for eight-month contracts.[95] This meant, however, that migrant labour was less proportionately cheap than hitherto, eventually provoking Sena Sugar's decision, already noted, to impose six-month contracts on its local labour and to turn further afield – to Milange and Morumbala – for its supplies of foodstuffs. It was a difficult calculation, the notorious 66 per cent efficiency of the Anguru

having to be balanced against the infamous 30 per cent absenteeism of the local workers, with the effects on food supplies almost impossible to quantify. In effect, however, the balance of forced labour shifted slightly from the supplier to the employer circumscription. This trend was confirmed in 1950 when the minimum wage rose to 60.00 *esc.* monthly and the company temporarily abandoned all recruiting in Ile under an agreement with the Gurue planters not to compete for labour.[96]

This decision caused consternation for the Ile administration, as it coincided with two fresh policy changes, and with a drought which in 1948–50 forced up food prices by between 60–150 per cent.[97] The Cotton Export Board released some unsuitable land from cotton growing; and in Gurue, the acting-Administrator abandoned the *laissez-faire* policies of 1945–9, which had led to such comparatively easy conditions on the tea estates, insisting that competition between the planters should be eliminated. He returned to a system of recruitment under which the planters shared a single agency, with compounds being erected along the roads to which chiefs were required to present given numbers of workers on given days, under threat of penal labour if they failed.[98] In the Administrator's presence, the workers were then assigned to the plantations with no freedom of choice. One consequence of this was that the total number of days worked at Gurue rose from 2 431 667 in 1949 to 4 116 203 in 1952.[99] Another was a further rise to 40 per cent by 1952 in the amount of foodstuffs which had to be imported into the circumscription, despite the fact that the planters were no longer competing in the quantity of food issued to workers. For Ile, therefore, two possible labour markets had been reduced at the same time that cotton demands were relaxed. At a time of booming prices it became Ile's turn to share to some extent in the business of growing food for the companies. Unfortunately the Administrator of Ile was unable to support his description with detailed statistics, but from 1945–58 the sale of surplus cassava rose from 1266 tonnes to 20 000 tonnes. Meanwhile, for part of this period from 1951–8, the number of workers contracted for jobs outside Ile fell from 17 441 to 12 724.[100]

In sum, then, the reality of forced labour in Quelimane district varied enormously after 1945. All Africans had to work for six months in the year and were supposed to be given a free choice of employers. In fact, the degree of compulsion to which they were subjected depended on the distance of their homes from the company plantations, on the ease with which they could emigrate to Nyasaland, on the actual conditions of work at the companies concerned and on the local value of the crops they could grow if left to themselves – expendable in the case of copra sold for export but indispensable in the case of maize, groundnuts, beans and cassava. To live in Lugella or Nhamarroi or Alto Moloque was to have the worst of all worlds, to have few or no local plantations and thus a labour 'surplus', to be cut off from the Nyasaland border, to be denied a market for peasant-grown crops and in all probability to be forced to work for one of the sisal companies. Behind such factors,

however, the ultimate cause of the system's brutality was the *Estado Novo*'s utopian vision that bureaucratic edict could solve any problem – that the district Governor, in co-operation with higher and metropolitan authorities, could study the tables submitted to him of wages and taxes, of labour needed and labour available, of peasant production figures, official food tables and official food prices, and simply manipulate one against the other to produce the desired harmony of interests, subject always to Portugal's requirements. It was a vision which constantly eluded implementation. There were too many incalculables – droughts, floods, disease, European commodity markets, the number, integrity and competence of officials. When anything went wrong it was the Africans who bore the consequences in the form of increased pressure. Despite the abundant evidence that they would respond to a market for their produce (hence the decline in emigration from Milange), and that they would work for good wages (hence the clandestine emigration to the Southern Rhodesian mines), the *Estado Novo* was capable of viewing them only as units of cheap labour. Shortages were explained by laziness, surpluses by good management. If maize prices rose in Gurue, officials stepped in to force them down; if tea prices plunged on the London market, tasks were lengthened on Oriental Tea's plantations; if copra prices climbed in Scandinavia, the *palmatoria* descended in Micaune. Meanwhile, in 1955, salaries paid by Sena Sugar Estates to its 435 'civilized' employees totalled 30 112 295.00 *esc.*, and to its 17 451 African labourers 23 065 668.00 *esc.* The company's pre-tax profit was £832 212, and the dividend to shareholders 8 per cent.[101]

Cotton and rice: the struggle for control

There was one kind of forced labour, however, which in all circumscriptions seems to have been remarkably similar – on the coast at Macuse, Quelimane or Chinde, close to company plantations at Luabo or Mocuba, far inland in Ile or Nhamarroi, and even on the Nyasaland border at Morumbala. This was the forced labour of the cotton and rice concessions. The new concession-holders enjoyed many of the powers originally granted to the company *prazo*-holders. They were responsible to the Cotton Export Board and the Rice Propaganda Division, and acted in virtual independence of the local Administrators and *chefes do posto*, whose position came to resemble that of the old agents of authority in the days of the *prazo* system. The Administrators were concerned with tax collection, in seeing that the men of their circumscription worked for six months per year, in arranging that there were adequate food supplies and possibly even something to export, in constructing roads and bridges and in ensuring that people were not driven by maltreatment to migrate from their area. All of these concerns were thrown into disarray by the arrival of the concession-holders whose only interest was to make profits from cotton and rice.

In the early years of the cotton drive when Portugal's urgent demand for cotton for its textile industry over-rode every humanitarian scruple of the *Estado Novo*, there seems to have been no limit on what concession-holders could do. Instructions issued in 1940 to the manager of the Zambesia Company's cotton concession at Mutarara suggest something of the methods employed. The company had suffered a series of losses because of poor crops and the new orders were revealingly precise. The manager was to secure a copy of the census, and see that every man, woman, boy and girl was provided with cotton seed; that every person, including the children irrespective of age, was to have one half-hectare of land cleared by November, and another half-hectare cleared by December, ready for planting in January; that the cotton seed was to be planted before any food crops; and that anyone who failed to comply was to be sent to the administration for punishment – which should not be necessary 'if the overseeing is done properly'. Finally, the manager was instructed not to accept any third-grade cotton as a way of 'avoiding work'.[102] These instructions must be seen in the light of the Mutarara Administrator's own comment in 1940, that it had yet to be proved that cotton would grow there at all.

As these instructions make clear, the Administrator was not simply a bystander, but had the positive duty of aiding the concession-holder. One of the Administrators, Nelson Saraiva Bravo, who served in several of Quelimane's circumscriptions, described what this entailed. The cotton year began in September, when the land was selected for cotton-growing. This was done by the concession-holder but since it involved questions of surveying and mapping, including the settlement of land disputes between rival chiefs, the Administrator was called in to arbitrate. This task was especially difficult when new lands were selected, as was frequently necessary because of soil exhaustion, and the Administrator had to persuade the African population with 'insistent paternal counsel' of the need to clear bush. There were disputes about the size of the plots measured by the overseer, and the Administrator would have to settle them. Similarly, whenever difficulties arose about getting the Africans to plant the requisite dozen cotton seeds per hole, or to replant the seeds up to three times if drought or floods destroyed the first plantings, or to thin the plants down to one plant per hole, or to perform the three weedings necessary during the growing season, or to pick the crop at the proper time, the administration was called in to assist:

> Unhappily, the intervention of each Administrative authority was sought dozens if not hundreds of times per year. . . . All these efforts were a continuous action, persistent, exhausting, and thankless.[103]

As the administration was only too well aware, the scheme was quite simply another forced labour scheme. Cotton, even in free labour situations, is an extraordinarily demanding crop. Excluding the time involved in clearing fresh lands, which usually involved tree felling, the

average number of days required to cultivate half a hectare of cotton was 150.[104] For this, in the years 1940–5, the growers of Quelimane district as a whole received on average just 40.60 *esc.* each. In Nhamarroi, the average annual per capita income was 9.00 *esc.* over the six years of cotton-growing, in Ile 28.00 *esc.*, in Mocuba and Pebane 32.00 *esc.*, and in Chinde 62.00 *esc.* Only in Morumbala, which was more suitable for cotton-growing, did the average income reach 136.00 *esc.*, a figure high enough to keep the growers from moving across the nearby Nyasaland border.[105] In spite of these poor rewards, not only were the Administrators unable to protest effectively at what was taking place, they were also expected to discipline through 'punishment' any protest from the Africans. In 1940, for example, the Cotton Export Board complained about the conduct of the *chefe do posto* at Mulevala, who had taken no action when the people burnt their cotton instead of bringing it to market. Mulevala was then in the circumscription of Maganja da Costa, where the average income for growers in 1940 was just 11.00 *esc.*, but the board demanded and secured a full investigation which resulted in the punishment of 25 women and 4 men, over-ruling the *chefe*'s comment that there was 'much discontent owing to the methods used which did discredit to the concessionaire (Monteiro e Giro) and prejudiced the cultivation'. The *chefe* pointed out a further difficulty, that the Zambesia Company was recruiting in the area of his *posto*, and claimed first use of the labour. The problem was, he explained, 'that the natives have to grow cotton but at the same time are compelled to perform other services for which they are recruited'.[106]

Given the urgency of the cotton drive even the Governor could do little to control what was happening. An *Ordem de Serviço* was issued in 1941 permitting the concession-holders to employ overseers, but insisting that they should remain under the control of the administration's *cypaes* and prohibiting 'rigorously and inflexibly all ill-treatment, assaults, confiscations, and violence against women'.[107] Like all Portuguese labour regulations, this was little more than a description of what was actually happening. A Sena song, popular among women throughout the areas of Sena Sugar's cotton concession, records accurately what was taking place:[108]

This season I've seen suffering, the cotton,	Maka uno ndina nyatwa tonje
Earthing up the cotton	*O – ay – ay tonje nyankwira*
This season, I have witnessed it, the cotton,	Maka uno nachiona tonje
Earthing up the cotton	*O – ay – ay tonje nyankwira*
I've been beaten, I've been beaten, the cotton,	Nameniwa nameniwa tonje
Earthing up the cotton	*O – ay – ay tonje nyankwira*
Gardening for the man, gardening for the man, the cotton,	Kulima kwache kulima kwache tonje
Earthing up the cotton	*O – ay – ay tonje nyankwira*

This season, I have witnessed it, the cotton.	Maka uno nachiona tonje
Earthing up the cotton.	*O ay ay tonje nyankwira*
Here, where can I find shelter, the cotton.	Ine pano nakhala kupi tonje
Earthing up the cotton.	*O ay ay tonje nyankwira*
I make my home in the long grass, the cotton.	Ndinakhala ndiri nsanga tonje
Earthing up the cotton.	*O ay ay tonje nyankwira*
Here, I find no rest, the cotton.	Ine pano sinagona tonje
Earthing up the cotton.	*O ay ay tonje nyankwira*

In another version of this song the performance included a short drama, this time in mime, to illustrate conditions under the cotton scheme. One woman walked to and fro, miming the sowing of cotton seed from the tin rattle she had been using to accompany the song. Then a second woman, representing the cotton overseer, ran forward and assaulted her sexually while she continued to plant the seed. Finally, the overseer beat her so violently that she fell and rolled sobbing on the ground.[109] Beatings and sexual degradation were the means by which the overseers, who were paid a bonus in relation to production, compelled the people to produce the cotton. In the words of one woman:

> If you were told to undress, we undressed. If he wanted to screw you, you let him screw you. Then he was happy, then he was happy. After that, he would beat you up. If you didn't let him screw you, that day you were in trouble; he would beat you up the whole of the time.[110]

The existence of such independent authorities within their circumscription caused the Administrators and *chefes do posto* enormous problems. Quite apart from the violence they had to sanction, and even to execute themselves as a last resort when the concession-holders referred defaulting growers to them, and quite apart from the discontent which militated against all their attempts to establish a paternalistic relationship with their people, there were the practical problems of famine. In all areas, food production suffered. Within Sena Sugar's concession, for instance, despite the company's order that the women had also to maintain maize gardens, the people had to supplement their inadequate maize production by buying it from the company at between 75.00 *esc.* and 110.00 *esc.* per 200 lb bag. In 1938, when the cotton scheme was just getting under way, Sena Sugar's stores sold 1708 tonnes of maize and millet to the people of the Lower Zambezi; in 1943, when the scheme was at the height of its brutality, they sold fully 6000 tonnes to them.[111] Similarly, in the circumscriptions to the north, famine conditions developed and traders who were accustomed to buying African-grown produce complained bitterly to the government that their very livelihood was threatened.[112]

The administration's first response to the problem, as we have seen,

another revealing for once the truth about the area under their control.[116]

Here, at last, however, was an issue on which the Quelimane Governor could take action, if only as an arbitrator. He was already much embarrassed by the public scandal that had arisen over the behaviour of the concession-holder for Maganja da Costa, Monteiro e Giro,[117] and in January 1947 he intervened in the Trabalho dispute, calling a meeting in Chinde between Ruy and Paiva, the Chinde Administrator and the *chefe do posto* of Luabo. Fortunately for Sena Sugar, the Governor arrived by the coast road from Quelimane, travelling through part of the rice-growing area, and subjected for much of his journey to 'an enormous tumult and complaint' from Africans along the roadside. Apparently shaken by the experience, the Governor ruled that the 'interests of the natives are paramount', a decision which given the peculiar circumstances of the conflict could only favour Sena Sugar, which was, after all, ultimately protecting its sugar interests and hence could appear to be flexible over cotton.[118] The company was allowed to retain the original cotton concession boundaries and continued to distribute seed to the Trabalho area under annual licence.

In 1950 the cotton concessions were rationalized. Colonial production as a whole had reached 33 437 tonnes or 95.6 per cent of Portugal's requirements, and the Cotton Export Board at last felt itself able to respond to the persistent criticisms of the administration. It conducted a soils survey and agreed to discontinue cotton-growing in unsuitable areas such as Mulevala and the Trabalho area of Luabo, also allowing Administrators to relax their pressures on the people.[119] In practice, however, as so often occurred when the Portuguese carried out reforms, the consequences for the Africans were a further increase in suffering. The subsequent history of Sena Sugar's cotton concession and of Arrozal's rice concession illustrates the continued helplessness of the administration.

The relaxation of the drive to grow cotton resulted in a series of losses for Sena Sugar, the crop falling from 387 tonnes of lint in 1950 to 82 tonnes in 1951 and a mere 40 tonnes in 1952. By December 1953 anxious letters were forecasting a loss of up to £70 000 and the company once again pondered whether it was worth while maintaining the concession.[120] There was dancing and feasting in the villages around Mopeia as rumours spread that the concession was being abandoned.[121] Rival firms, however, began to show interest, with Lopes e Irmão and Monteiro e Giro filing applications in Lourenço Marques to take over Sena Sugar's area, and in Lisbon Dr Francisco Machado, who as Minister of the Colonies had organized the original cotton drive in 1938, and Rafael Duque, a former Minister of Agriculture, suggested a new company be formed to operate the concession. As neither 'owing to their positions could be shown as share-holders', it was proposed that Machado be represented by his brother-in-law, João de Silva Contreiras, a Cotton Export Board inspector who had recently visited Mopeia, and Duque by his son, who had recently joined Lopes e Irmão

as partner.[122] C. B. Hornung, to whom the approach was made, was briefly tempted: if Sena Sugar could retain an interest, it was possible that these 'important people' might get the planting and uprooting regulations relaxed and ensure that the labour was properly organized. His ultimate rejection of the proposal, however, demonstrated that the basic issues involved in cotton had not changed over eighteen years:

> I now understand that the method employed by the other cotton concession holders is to distribute the seed to the men and not the women, and according to the local regulations if a man grows one hectare of cotton he is exempted from being recruited for six months per annum for a European. It therefore seems clear that, quite apart from the lower ground of our concession which is subject to flooding, these people who hope to obtain our concession would expect to grow a big crop by getting all the population of the remainder of the concession to grow cotton which, in other words, means that we would obtain no men whatever for the sugar plantations and which, of course, is a position which we could not tolerate.[123]

Instead Sena Sugar decided to reorganize the cotton scheme itself, shifting the headquarters from Mopeia to Luabo, where a closer scrutiny could be kept of expenses, and entrusting it to Alberto de Paiva Raposo. By re-employing men discarded by the Mopeia administration – men like José Guillerme and Fernando Braz Valezim – and by offering them bonuses for high cotton production, Paiva succeeded in recreating in the mid-1950s the atmosphere of brutality that had typified the 1940s. Guillerme was notorious for beating and assaulting the women, but Valezim's reputation was even worse. Valezim used to seize babies from women's backs and hide them in a box to make their mothers work:[124]

Varajin, oh give me the child!
Varajin
Give the child!
Varajin
Give the child!
Varajin
Give the child!
Varajin, I haven't rested,
Varajin
Chorus
Varajin, since morning,
Varajin
Chorus
Varajin, I'm worn out worrying,
Varajin
Chorus

Varajin ndipase mwana
Varajin
Pase mwana – ay
Varajin
Pase mwana – ay
Varajin
Pase mwana – ay
Varajin sinagona
Varajin
Pase mwana – ay (rpt)
Varajin cha machibese
Varajin
Pase mwana – ay (rpt)
Varajin chitagonera
Varajin
Pase mwana – ay (rpt)

> I ask, 'Where is the child? I haven't seen the child at all.' Varajin takes the child and puts it in a box and sits on it. I went together with my friends, women like myself. We went about looking and asking, 'Where is the child?' Everyone

said they had not seen it at all. The child was with Varajin! He had put it in a box because, he said, 'I've found that you haven't finished the cotton at all. So I took your child and shut it up in the box.'

Varajin, oh give me the child!	Varajin ndipase mwana
Varajin	Varajin
Chorus	*Pase mwana – ay* (rpt)
Varajin, since morning,	Varajin cha machibese
Varajin	Varajin
Chorus	*Pase mwana – ay* (rpt)

The reign of Guillerme and Valezim paid off for the company. In 1959, when Mozambique exported 35 051 tonnes of cotton to Portugal, worth 540 million *esc.*, Sena Sugar made its first small profit on cotton in eight years.[125] By then the problem of the cotton concession was almost over.

Meanwhile, however, also as a result of the 1950 reforms the Trabalho area of Luabo had been released from cotton-growing and handed instead over to Arrozal – though such was Ruy's inefficiency that it was two more years before he claimed it, during which the Africans were free from any forced cultivation. In 1953, however, Ruy and his agents were able to extend their reign of terror.[126] The region's oral traditions and songs recall the rice concession with great vividness:

> A long time ago we used to work for Ruy. We didn't work for him by our own choice. It was a punishment ... A big garden was worked by only one woman. If you did not do very much, they came and beat you very hard. There was no fooling around. The children at home would stay the whole day without being fed. If the birds ate the rice that you had been given to plant, they beat you, saying, 'While the birds were eating the rice, where were you?'
>
> If you finally produced five or six bags of rice, Ruy would come and pay only 200.00 *esc.* or 300.00 *esc.*, and you remained without food and suffered with hunger. If you were found as having produced only one or two bags, you were taken by Ruy's agents and they would screw you, even if your husband was there. Your husband couldn't complain, 'You sepoys, why are you sleeping with my wife?' If he did that, your husband would be beaten and sent to prison.
>
> That's what Ruy did! We slept in the bush, just waiting until we heard the steamer going. You might sit on a snake or tramp through shit – that together with all the other suffering. The punishment we used to get from Ruy was terrible![127]

The Administrator of Luabo supported these complaints. He pointed out that instead of having the women plant the legal half-hectare and then buying what they produced on that half-hectare, Ruy and his *cypaes* were simply descending upon the villages in armed raids for whatever rice they could lay their hands on. This left the people without adequate food supplies to get them through the year, and they would be compelled to purchase their requirements from local shops.[128] The

following song from Pirira village dramatizes the reality of Ruy's raids:[129]

Here comes Ruy's steamer	Apa Shitima ya Ruy
	A – a – ay
Run away!	*Tawani*
	A – a – ay
Run away gardeners!	*Tawani machambero*
	A – a – ay
Run away gardeners!	*Tawani machambero*
	A – a – ay
(rpt)	
You must run, father!	Nda mutawe baba – ay
You must run, mother!	Nda mutawe mama
You must run, mother – father!	Nda mutawe mama – ay baba
You must run, father!	Nda mutawe baba – ay
You must run, mother!	Nda mutawe mama
You must run from that village!	Nda mutawe mudzi mo – ay – ay
Brothers, you must run from that village!	Abale mutawe mudzi mo
Father, a devil has descended on the village.	A baba – mudzi mwafika chizimo
Father, you must run from that place.	Baba – mutawe mwene mo
Fathers! Brothers! The steamer!	A baba – abale – Shitima
Fathers! Brothers! The steamer!	A baba – abale – Shitima
Fathers! Brothers! The steamer!	A baba – abale – Shitima
Father, fear for Pirira!	A – ay baba gopa Pirira
Father, fear for Pirira!	A – ay baba gopa Pirira
Father, fear for Pirira!	A – ay baba gopa Pirira
You must run, you must run!	Ay – mutawe mutawe
Run! You must run! Run!	Mutawire mutawe mutawire
Father, you must run fast, father!	Ay – baba – ay mutawire – ay baba
You must run from that village	Ay – mutawe mudzi mo
You must run from that village	Ay – mutawe mudzi mo
Get rid of that *kachasu* of yours!	Mutaya nipa zanu zo
The *cypae* has come	Ay – abwera nsupai – ay
The *cypae* has come	Ay – abwera nsupai – ay
The *cypae* has come	Ay – abwera nsupai – ay
Today you'll be tied up	Ay – munamangwa lero
Today you'll be tied up	Ay – munamangwa lero
Today you'll be tied up	Ay – munamangwa lero
Father,	Ay – baba – ay
You who are brewing *kachasu* today,	Adapenga nipa lero
You must run away, father!	Ay – mutawe baba – ay
Mother, always I have nightmares!	Mama – ay ndisafamba mbandilota

You'll be tied up with rope.	Munamangwa na ngume
Mother – you Pirira people are finished today.	Mama – ay mwamala Pirira Lero
Mother, I've heard you've been shipped away	Mama – ay ndava mwapakiswa
Mother, I've heard you've been shipped away	Mama – ay ndava mwapakiswa
Mother, I've heard you've been shipped away	Mama – ay ndava mwapakiswa
Gone aboard, you've gone aboard	Ay – ay pakira mwapakira
Gone aboard, you've gone aboard	Ay – ay pakira mwapakira
You've been shipped away in the steamer.	Mwapakiswa pa Shitima

Chorus rpt

The people still remember that when

> people used to see a boat coming, they would run away. People would say that because it was a boat, it must be Ruy. That would mean that the sepoys would be coming again like they did that other day. Everyone would run into the bush, taking no food or anything. If there was someone working in his garden, he would come to the village shouting, 'Run away! Run away! Ruy's coming! Run away!' Then everyone would run off into the grass. A small child could not cry out lest the sepoys hear it. So you had to press the child's mouth to muffle it. People hid in the bush because of the suffering that the women were enduring.[130]

Fortunately Ruy's inefficiency prevented him from ever exploiting the whole of his concession, which included the swamp areas on the Zambezi banks near Mopeia. As the Administrator of Mopeia commented in 1954, it was 'a good thing' that the concession-holder was showing no sign of life: rather than rouse him 'it would be much less of an evil to annihilate this land which God does not bless'.[131]

Yet, as the Administrator of Chinde pointed out in 1954, none of this was necessary to produce rice for the colony. The women grew rice in any case and if they could have obtained the free market price of 200.00 *esc.* a sack – as against the official buying price of 92.00 *esc.* at which Ruy made his confiscations – they would have produced ample amounts.[132] Where no labour problems arose from the existence of peasant production the Administrators preferred to rely upon the inducements of a competitive market system such as had existed in the Zambezi delta before Arrozal's founding or still flourished in the maize areas of Milange and Morumbala. As for cotton, the Administrators well knew that it was not a crop suitable for most of the district and saw no purpose in attempting to grow it. As the Administrator of Ile wrote:

> Happily, the area of this circumscription was never included in any *Circulo Orizicola*, the native being free to sell his surplus rice in the open market. . . .

> However, the natives still have to suffer another cotton campaign with all the correlative damage to their interests and carried out with whatever violence.[133]

The Administrators, however, did not formulate policy regarding the concession system. When compulsory rice- and cotton-growing were finally abolished in 1961 it was not pressure from the Administrators and *chefes do posto* that was responsible but the complaints voiced internationally about forced labour in Mozambique and the imminence of an on-the-spot investigation by the International Labour Organization.

The drive for improvement

In the context of the concession system the local Administrators were helpless since the concession-holders were responsible directly to boards appointed by the central government. In supplying contract labour to the companies, however, the Administrators were at the centre of the process and far from helpless. It was in this area that the tensions between capitalism and the administration became most evident. While tacitly accepting that work remained compulsory under the terms of the 1942 Circular and that this fact could be loosely reconciled with the Labour Code only by the claim, frequently unjustified, that Africans had a free choice of employers, the administration leaned increasingly hard on the companies to ensure that those sections of the Labour Code which concerned the welfare of workers *were* enforced without equivocation. This pressure, which existed even in the early 1940s, intensified after 1945 following Caetano's speech. It was the only possible compromise. If the system had proved impossible to abolish its effects could be mitigated with the Administrators exercising a paternalistic concern that the capitalist companies – exploitative and for the most part foreign – should operate as humanely as possible. In 1945 the Governor of Quelimane issued a series of instructions re-emphasizing and re-defining the welfare provisions of the Labour Code. While no Africans were to be allowed to live 'in indolence' the emphasis of Caetano's speech that work should be made attractive to them was given bureaucratic substance by the requirement that all contracts should be properly regulated with full records kept so that no one could be penalized unjustly for not working at all or for not completing approved tasks, that the employers should observe scrupulously the provisions of the Labour Code and should show that conditions were regularly improving, and that no workers should be required to leave their homes for more than six months at a time.[134] There was nothing, of course, for the companies to object to in this and the concern with the stability of family life was reflected also in the ideological emphasis of the *Estado Novo* upon the preservation of ethnic identity and its fear of proletarianization.

There were practical measures, however, which the companies unsuccessfully tried to resist. The official food requirements were

this emphasis in the oral testimony. At this point, however, the unanimity ceases, for the imposition of Portuguese rule after 1930 was interpreted in two quite different ways, corresponding geographically to two different experiences. Inland from Quelimane, in the circumscriptions of Alto Moloque, Ile, Gurue and Nhamarroi, Portuguese rule brought an intensification of taxation and of the demand for migrant labour, plus a new demand for the labour of women. Historically these areas had never been fully incorporated into the old *prazo* system. The brief period of state or Lugella Company rule, though brutal in ways already described and provoking massive emigration, had been sufficiently haphazard for the small-scale village systems of the late nineteenth century to survive. The arrival of the new Administrators and *chefes do posto* in these areas, and of the new chiefs and headmen they appointed as intermediaries, brought a degree of systematic exploitation which surpassed anything the people had experienced. It could only be countered by statements of entirely personal commitment: in the testimony of people from these areas, husbands, wives, children and gardens are the only points of reference. On the Zambezi, however, and along the coast, the effect of direct Portuguese rule was to strengthen the relationship of the Africans to the companies, that relationship of client to patron which, as we have already noted, was itself an inheritance of the *prazo* system. The companies were seen as protectors against a new enemy, while all the evils of the new regime were blamed on the Portuguese.

The company as patron

In earlier chapters we have noted how, in the case of Sena labourers working for Sena Sugar, this relationship was implied through their work songs. These songs frequently express satire or complaint, but do so in the context of two merging traditions, one of which, as in many canoe songs, associates manual labour with obscenity, and the other of which assumes that, within a hierarchical system, complaint is to be expressed formally through song. The effect of the former is drastically to limit the impact of the meaning expressed. Songs which, to the actual singers, record protest about long hours or the use of the whip, often consist of no more than a stream of undirected obscenities.[3] The effect of the latter is that the protest, as for example in the early versions of the *Paiva* song, springs from an acceptance of the very system which has created the complaint. It demands not an end to the company, but a fairer share of the proceeds. The hierarchy is accepted: the demand is for greater reciprocity. Thus, it is no contradiction that the *Paiva* song should actually have encouraged harder work, or that others of the work songs, such as *Masamanga*, should have been directed against fellow-workers who were not pulling their weight![4]

Masamanga Masamanga
Oy – e

Masamanga Masamanga
Oy – e

Masamanga Masamanga
Oy – e
Masamanga, the child of Mara
Oy – e
She buys flour with her cunt

Masamanga Masamanga
Oy – e
Masamanga mwana Mara
Oy – e
Wagula nyini gayiwa

This immensely popular men's song, apparently satirizing a woman, was in fact used to ridicule fellow-workers who were not doing their fair share of a joint task. This happened too, on the coconut plantations where workers who finished their tasks late were 'always put to shame by other workers who called them many names'.[5] For those who did not accept the system there was always the alternative of flight, to the Zambezi islands, to Mozambique Company territory, or to Nyasaland.

The movement of opinion after the Portuguese takeover of the *prazos* is best illustrated by another version of the *Paiva* song, the most elaborate and complete performance available:[6]

Ay – ay
Paiva's the master
Ay – ay
Paiva, I've seen hardship
Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Paiva, I've killed his money for him, his penis.

Ay – ay
Pavia ndi mbuya
Ay – ay
Paiva ndawona nyatwa
Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Paiva ndampera dinyero ache nsondo wache

Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Ay – ay
Paiva, I'm being arrested
Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Paiva, I've killed his money for him, his penis.

Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Ay – ay
Paiva ndinamangiwa
Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Paiva ndampera dinyero ache nsondo wache

Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Ay – ay
Paiva is mother
Ay – ay
Arrests used to be made.
Paiva, I've killed his money for him, his penis.

Ay – ay
Paiva – ay
Ay – ay
Paiva ndi mama
Ay – ay
Kumanga pika chitwa
Paiva ndampera dinyero ache nsondo wache

1st Man: The white man's always harassing us, the white man.
He's finishing us off, Horsi.
He's finishing us off – Hair.
Sugar! That one, Mr Mother's Cunt!

Company official about Lomwe recruits to *Prazos* Anguaze and Andone in 1918,[33] and the theme developed in the 1920s and 1930s when the high death rate among Lomwe workers at Luabo was attributed to their habit of eating uncooked food, their maize flour being simply mixed with cold water and drunk.[34] To Sena Sugar the Anguru were weak, slow and lazy, a mere 66 per cent efficient compared to the 'civilized' Ngoni, and the observation draws some force from the report of a Portuguese anthropologist that average Lomwe adult males weighed only 38 kg.[35] Above all, they were considered backward. When Armindo Monteiro, the Colonial Minister, visited Ile in 1932, he was greeted by women, no more than thirty years old, still wearing the *pelele* or lip-ring, and photographs of Lomwe women with lip-rings and bark-cloth feature in most Portuguese publications about Mozambique during the 1940s, in which the word 'Lomwe' invariably attracted the adjective 'savage'. Moreover, to the Africans of the Zambezi valley, the newcomers to the estates were also seen as contemptible and primitive:

> They used to be called 'Aparapatu' because they were dirty people. They never wore cloth, just a little rag covering their front, and whenever they used to cook their meals they used to sit down to eat, and move just a few inches away and start shitting, and then come back to eat. They used to work for the company and they were very dirty.[36]

It is a relief to turn from such archival and oral evidence to the creations of the people themselves:[37]

I suffer, I do,
Oyi – ya – e – e
I suffer, I do
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
What's to be done?
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
I cultivate my cotton,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
Picking, picking a whole basketful,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
I've taken it to the Boma there,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
They've given me five escudos,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
When I reflect on all this,
Oyi – ya – e – e
I suffer, I do,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
My husband, that man
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
He went there to Luabo
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
He went to work, work hard
I suffer, my heart is weeping,

Kohaw'oye,
Oyi – ya – e – e
Kohaw'oye,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Miyano thitho?
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Nochochi nakalimi,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Alulo, alulo etokwa,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
oPoma iwe keliwo,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Kinyiβiwo nekomi,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Miyo wupuwela – ay,
Oyi – ya – e – e
Kohaw'oye,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Ayakali hali
Kohawa, murima onanla,
oLuapo iwe keli
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Olapawaya lapi,
Kohawa, murima onanla,

He broke off some sugar cane for himself,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
Leaving work, he was arrested,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
He was taken to the police,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
He was beaten on the hand,
I suffer, my heart is weeping,
When I reflect on all this,
Oyi – ya – e – e
I suffer, I do,
I suffer, my heart is weeping.

Alikintaki muhali ali,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Eβinyekali makiβo,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Wapulisiya keli,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Anamiwa matani,
Kohawa, murima onanla,
Miyo wupuwela – ay,
Oyi – ya – e – e
Kohaw'oye,
Kohawa, murima onanla.

Compared with such economy of expression, the mixed Sena–Portuguese of the Zambezi delta, with its obsessive obscenities, seems little better than a pidgin.

Immediately, however, the song underlines the enormous contrast in experience between the Africans of the old *prazos* and those of the inland regions. The woman gets only 5.00 *esc.* for her year's work in cotton-growing. This is no exaggeration: the singer comes from Mulevala, one of the *postos* of the circumscription of Ile which was later condemned as unsuitable for cotton-growing. Meanwhile her husband is beaten for eating a piece of the sugar cane he is harvesting. Again the complaint is justified: Sena Sugar claimed to lose hundreds of tons of sugar cane per year through theft, and the penalties were severe.[38] But the song's shape, as it moves from the singer's experience to that of her husband, stresses an even more important theme, that of separation of husband and wife. For the people outside the old company *prazos* forced labour involved forced migration. While the Africans of Mopeia or Macuse experienced over a space of fifty years a gradual increase of compulsory labour annually from a fortnight to three or four months for companies they accepted as patrons, the people of Ile, Alto Moloque or Maganja da Costa found themselves quite suddenly subject to six months' forced labour far from home for companies of which they knew almost nothing. We have already considered the consequences for peasant agriculture. After 1920, when the men were taken, removed during the growing season from communities which had shared all agricultural labour equally between husbands and wives, production of groundnuts and sesame for export practically ceased, while cassava, the easiest-grown and least nourishing of all African foodstuffs, became the main subsistence crop. The Portuguese response in their effort to restore export potential to indigenous agriculture through the compulsory cotton and rice schemes only made matters worse. Yet the song, legitimately, does not concentrate on such follies. The theme is not just 'Paiva, father, I've been beaten' or 'I've gone without food since morning', but rather, Look what is happening to our family! The following example, sung by a woman from the section of Maganja da Costa where Lopes e Irmão ran the rice concession, makes the point even more

economically and poignantly. The song begins with the message that her husband has reached Marromeu safely:[39]

Marromeu has spoken	Ologo Marromeu
He has arrived	*Opiyaa*
Marromeu has spoken	Ologo Marromeu
He has arrived	*Opiyaa*
Marromeu has spoken	Ologo Marromeu
He has arrived, Marromeu	*Opiyaa Marromeu*
I grow my rice	Ndilimi mbukaka
He has arrived	*Opiyaa*
I am watching the road	Nangeneli odila
He has arrived	*Opiyaa*
The road is empty of people	Odila kunda mutu
He has arrived, Marromeu	*Opiyaa Marromeu*

There is little in the songs from the Mopeia and Luabo areas to match such concerns. It is true that in their song-drama version of the *Paiva* song, the women balanced their own experience against that of the men. But in general the emphasis in the Sena work-songs is on individual suffering and the need for personal survival – a concern which is the natural inheritance of the slave trading of the nineteenth century and its complete disruption of larger ethnic loyalties. Marriage becomes something of a war, the women being viewed as answering a single need:[40]

You young girls	Asikana mwe
O	*O*
When bending over	Pankotamu
That's where the balm of cunt is!	*Pana ntombwe wanyini*

and the men being judged as providers, as patrons on an individual scale:[41]

My husband is useless	Mamunanga walula, eh
Eeh, oh, he is useless!	Eeh, o – walula!
When he wants a cigarette,	Mamunanga alula ache ndi manyengo,
He goes and stands in the doorway.	Angafuna kandudu limila pansuwo.

This misery of the Anguru over the disruption of their family life draws even greater force, however, when contrasted with the attitudes of a second group of migrant workers, those of the Ngoni. Some Ngoni had worked for the Boror Company, coming mainly from Nyasaland at the turn of the century, but following the rumours of a sleeping sickness epidemic they had turned their attention instead to Sena Sugar's estates, starting with Caia in 1908. After J. P. Hornung gained control of *Prazo* Angonia in 1911 Ngoni came from both sides of the border and quickly made themselves indispensable, establishing a reputation for being strong and hard-working, capable of cutting and loading

amounts of cane far in excess of local workers. After 1930, when Hornung lost the *prazo* and Sena Sugar still required 1500 annually, he secured them, in competition with the Southern Rhodesian recruiters, by raising salaries and by allowing them to bring their wives. They became the labour aristocracy of Sena Sugar estates, a high percentage coming on twelve-month contracts. Many of the hated *capitães* were Ngoni, as this popular Sena song testifies:[42]

Balls-owner, Balls-owner
You standing penis, the sun is going down
Your mother's penis, Ngoni!
Look!
Look!
Look, you!
Look, Balls-owner!
Look, you!
Look, Balls-owner!

Samuchende, Samuchende

Mbolo zololo kangana zuwa yadoka
Mbolo yamako, Ngoni
Ona!
Ona!
Ona! iwe!
Ona Samuchende!
Ona, iwe!
Ona Samuchende!

The first contrast between the Ngoni songs and those of the Sena and of the Anguru is the absence of any songs dealing specifically with their own experience of working in the cane-fields. The Ngoni delight in singing songs from home, songs of *ngoma* dancing or even Christian hymns. But asked for work-songs or indeed anything of a political nature, they can only stumble their way through some of the Sena songs, such as *Ona Samuchende*, their particular contribution being to *chewa*-ize many of the words and to slow the tunes down, with heavy bass harmonies and long pauses, to such a point that the Sena people present no longer recognize them. Indeed, if work were done at such a pace, appropriate to the slow stamping of the *ngoma* dance, the first sugar crop at Caia would still await harvesting! The reasons for this may be quite simple. Cane cutting, the Ngoni's main job, does not require the kind of communal rhythmic effort that pushing the loaded trucks does, and hence does not give rise to the kind of singing which would be an aid to labour. Moreover, their appointment as *capitães* and their position as a labour élite made them the target of songs rather than singers. Their experience of working for Sena Sugar was never comparable to that of the other migrant group, the Anguru. The company was always anxious to placate them and after 1930 it seems to have been successful in encouraging annually a completely volunteer Ngoni contingent. One self-delectative song states clearly why they come:[43]

I am singing because I am alone
I am singing because I am alone
I have to work because I haven't any money.
But now this year I have some.

Ndinakuzimba kala ndeka – ay
Ndinakuzimba kala ndeka – ay

Ndigwire nchito ndalama ndiribe
Chaka chino ndiri nazo

the *kazembes* imposed by Maganja da Costa's rulers. All the rest were descended from men who had led bands of refugees into the area from Marral, Lacerdonia, Niassa, or the Lugella Company's *prazos*.[54] The point was that the post of 'native authority' as the Portuguese envisaged it, with chiefs exercising autocratic power over large areas through systems of subordinate chiefs, and making themselves wealthy through levying tribute, had not existed in the hinterland in pre-colonial times when, as we have seen, the response to slave-raiding had been the proliferation of hundreds of fortified hilltop villages. Thus, when the Portuguese required 'traditional authorities' to collaborate in governing the inland regions, they selected them by quite arbitrary means:

> The chief was chosen by the government. When they came in a village like this one, they would gather everybody together and look for a clever one and name him a chief, and everybody would have to respect him for his title. Even a bad one.[55]

It is in this context that we can understand the very special hatred for these state-appointed *Samasoas* and *Mwenes*, with their suddenly acquired powers to levy taxes and compel labour. Just as the threat to the family is the dominant complaint of the Anguru songs, so the chiefs are the principal enemies, the state's tools of oppression:[56]

You can do it	Munada mwiri – ay
You can do it	*Munada mwiri – ay*
You can do it	Munada mwiri – ay
You can do it	*Munada mwiri – ay*
You can find the samasoa and beat him up	Mofani samasoa movadi
You can do it	*Munada mwiri – ay*
But the samasoa is a powerful man.	Samasoa ndi mundimuweni.

Such complaints relate partly to the chief's official function as labour recruiter, responsible for supplying labour to the Company recruiters, or to the *cypais*, or for presenting the required numbers of workers at the administration building or at roadside recruiting posts:[57]

The headman – ay – ay – ay – ay	Amwene – ay – ay – ay – ay
The headman harassed and seized one of my sons for Luabo.	Amwene akita emusokela mwanaka oLuabo.
The other went to São Thomé and never returned.	Oleya mukina okele a São Thomé kanathi.
I'm going to bury the headman and build my house on his head!	Empakela kintomeya βamoro βamwene!
The headman – ay – ay – ay – ay	Amwene – ay – ay – ay – ay

Similarly, they were hated for their role as tax-collectors, as in the following work-song:[58]

I'm being tied up
I'm being tied up far from home
Tax, tax
My heart is angry

Ndimangewa – ay
Ndimangewa mundali
Msongo msongo
Morima onokuta

By comparison, the songs along the Zambezi or from the coastal *prazos* make no reference at all to taxation, the tradition of paying tribute being long established – as Caldas Xavier had argued in 1889 as justification for the company-*prazo* system.

However, the hatred was not only for the chief in his official capacity, combining everything in the Sena songs about the *chefe do posto*, the cotton overseer, the *cypai* and the recruiter, into a single representative enemy. These state-appointed chiefs, created in accordance with a Portuguese notion of how African life ought to be lived, had in fact no traditions by which to define their role and they frequently exercised their new authority in a completely arbitrary and dictatorial manner. This was not, of course, true of all of them. Several annual reports refer to instances of 'passive resistance' by local chiefs, which is scarcely surprising given the fact that they had to live with their subjects, and there were cases where the administration dismissed chiefs for not complying with orders: Chief Rancho Molezo, for example, son of the Molezo who had enjoyed 'great prestige' among the people in Namacurra, was dismissed by Administrator Dias Raphael for showing 'bad comportment to the *chefe do posto*', and the oral evidence is occasionally sympathetic in recognizing that chiefs 'would be beaten up' if they failed to carry out instructions.[59] More often, however, chiefs were dismissed following complaints to the administration about drunkenness or 'acts of extortion and violence':[60, 61]

The headman – ay,
The headman – ay,
The headman – ay.
The headman eats from the plate!

Amwene – ay,
Amwene – ay,
Amwene – ay,
Amwene ßanja parato!

The song means that he is powerful enough to walk into anyone's house without invitation and to help himself to anything he desires. Finally, in eloquent confirmation of the complaint of the Administrator of Gurue in 1952 that chiefs frequently mistreated the wives of men they recruited for the tea plantations,[62] there is an immensely bitter women's song, incorporating the whole gamut of complaint against the chiefs – their arbitrariness in selecting recruits, their abuse of wives, the injustice of the total economic system of which they are the local expression. The chiefs are satirized under a set of names: Anankhollo, meaning 'he-goat'; Anamthullu, 'impotent bull'; Amullalleya, 'court

messenger'; Amukhopella, 'upstart'; all of them expressing the contempt of the Lomwe women for the nonentities to whom the Portuguese had given such position. All are nicknamed 'hoe-handle' in reference to their constant priapic condition:[63]

Anankhollo, hoe-handle,
Anankhollo, hoe-handle,
It's not that I want to summon you.
You chose my husband yesterday.
You sent him to the work place,
Then you came to bang on my door,
You took me for a prostitute
Ali
You took me for a prostitute
Ali

Anankhollo, nviniyaka
Anankhollo, nviniyaka
Nkilakenle worumani
Musonke yaka othilo
Mwakeriha werimiyawo
Mukokaka mana nchiβi
Mwakona okala puta
Ali
Mwakona okala puta
Ali

Anamthullu, hoe-handle
Anamthullu, hoe-handle
It's not that I want to summon you.
You chose my husband yesterday,
You sent him to the work place,
Then you came to bang on my door,
You took me for a whore
Ali
You took me for a whore
Ali

Anamthullu, nviniyaka
Anamthullu, nviniyaka
Nkilakenle worumani
Musonke yaka othilo
Mwakeriwa werimiyawo
Mukokaka mana nchiβi
Mwakona okala mulolowanyu
Ali
Mwakona okala mulolowanyu
Ali

Amullalleya, hoe-handle
Amullalleya, hoe-handle
My heart is worn out,
My heart is worn out,
My husband came back the day before yesterday
Today, he's been picked up again.
I am worn out
Ali
A – ay – ay – ay – ay
Ali

Amullalleya, nviniyaka
Amullalleya, nviniyaka
Morimola wohapaleya
Morimola wohapaleya

Ayaka arule oraji
Olelo anamusokiwa
Miyano kohapaleya
Ali
A – ay – ay – ay – ay
Ali

Amukhopella, hoe-handle
Amukhopella, hoe-handle
It's not that I want to summon you
I too would like someone to work in my garden.
Last year, when you picked him up,
You took me for a whore
Ali
You took me for a whore
Ali

Amukhopella, nviniyaka
Amukhopella, nviniyaka
Nkilakenle worumani

Olimeliwa wokinkela
Mwakoli musokiwanyu
Mwakona okala mulolowanyu
Ali
Mwakona okala mulolowanyu
Ali

The company as destroyer

The Anguro songs discussed so far deal, of course, with conditions at home, in Ile, Gurue, Alto Moloque and Maganja da Costa. But the men travelling to work for the companies also created songs out of the new experience, and to these many of the same comments apply. Once again the contrast with the Sena material is striking. While the Sena workers sing:[64]

O capitão
O capitão
O capitão
Your mother's prick, capitão I'm tired!

O capitão
O capitão
O capitão
Mbolo yamako, capitão, ndaneta

the Chuabo equivalent is:[65]

Capitão Julius,
Capitão Julius,

Capitão Juliusi
Capitão Juliusi

Come, you should write my name down,
I've finished the task.

Ode onilembe
Olaba nimala

Time's up, it's getting dark.
Time's up, it's getting dark.

Watiβa βanuriba
Watiβa βanuriba

Capitão Julius,
Excellentissimo, come here.

Capitão Juliusi
Nabwia kadawuno

Come on, write my name down,
I've finished the task

Katha onilembe
Olaba nimala

'Where were you born?'
I was born in Linga

Onaniwa buβi
Onaniwa oLinga

'Now, you will see,
You're going to be kept late, you are!'

Dabuno onona
Onoribeliwa wayo

The complaint in the two songs is precisely the same, that the *capitães* are keeping the workers too long in the fields. But it is the Chuabo song which fills in the details – the *capitão*'s name, the tyranny of the ticket system, the phoney grandeur it confers on nonentities, the personal favouritism with the special persecution of those from alien areas – Linga being *Arringa*, the local name for Maganja da Costa. While the Sena song insults an individual, the Chuabo version broadens into a commentary on the whole system.

Once again the explanation of the differences lies in the past and in the historical contrast between those areas which lay within the *prazo* system and those which lay without. We have noted already the slow evolution within the *prazos* from slavery to contract labour, the demands of the companies being essentially a modification of the demands of the *prazo*-holders, with the companies having always to

balance their impositions against the threat of migration. Forced labour, increasing only gradually from one fortnight to three or four months per year, and eventually to six, was not the sudden moral and psychological shock as it was to the Anguru peoples. Within the company *prazos* the original work-songs continued to be an adequate form of expression, given the constant appearance of new persons as targets – until, that is, the cotton and rice concession system extended forced labour to the women and new dramatic forms were devised to express the women's sense of outrage at this development.

Inland, however, the arrival of white men with their sudden demands was unprecedented. The popular machila-bearers' song 'You weep, you sleep stiffly when you are old', dating from the days of Lugella Company, which we discussed in Chapter 4, expressed their astonishment at the white men's impositions – 'White men have come to be worked for . . . People have to work for them, that's true!' To express this sense of amazement, a form was devised capable of dramatizing the whole situation, the style ranging from imitation to complaint. Another example of this flexibility may be seen in a work-song on the subject of *capitães*:[66]

Mother, the capitão means what he says!	*Mama* capitão kanota
Mother, 'You must push the trolley!'	*Mama* mukweweke kareta
Mother, 'More power for up the slope!'	*Mama* libere omokoni
Mother, we're being tied up as well.	*Mama* omakiβa βasolo
Mother, the capitão means what he says!	*Mama* capitão kanota
Mother, 'Go further up the hill'.	*Mama* ndowaka omokoni
Mother, 'The trolley isn't full'.	*Mama* kareta kinβela
Mother, 'You, pull the trolley!'	*Mama* mukapusha kareta
Mother, 'You with the arsehole aren't working.'	*Mama* namukongo kaneta
Mother, the capitão means what he says.	*Mama* capitão kanota
Mother, 'You! Hold the trolley.'	*Mama* mukaputa kareta
Mother, 'You with the penis aren't moving'.	*Mama* nambolo we kaneta
Mother, 'You with the penis aren't budging'.	*Mama* nambolo we kudenda
Mother, 'Go further up the hill!'	*Mama* ndowaka omokoni
Mother, let's go, it's night time.	*Mama* ndowaka βarila
Mother, we're being beaten up as well.	*Mama* oβadiwa βasolo
Mother, the whip again as well.	*Mama* etema βakaβweni

This is the only Lomwe or Chuabo song collected that includes obscenities but the obscenities are only in the *capitão*'s speeches and the words used are Sena, not Chuabo, in origin. The singers are, in other words, mimicking the rudeness of the Sena overseers, reporting home in a range of voices, while the other complaints about physical assault are

expressed in Chuabo. The appeal to 'Mother' is also worth attention. In the Sena songs, the reference is to Paiva, the protector; in this song from Maganja da Costa, the reference is back home to the family.

Given such range and flexibility in the forms they used to describe their experience of forced labour it is not surprising that the Lomwe–Chuabo people should be the ones most sharply critical of the company system:[67]

I'm working, in hunger,	Kilapa ntala
The owners are full;	Anene evone
It's a bad sign	Withamalaβa
It's a bad sign	Withamalaβa

or that they should have arrived at a much deeper sense than either the Sena or the Ngoni of its essentially destructive nature:[68]

This finished off the young men,	Ola ohamala alopwana
The Company – ay	*Companhia – ay*
This finished off the young men,	Ola ohamala alopwana
The Company – ay	*Companhia – ay*
This finished off the young men,	Ola ohamala alopwana
Hair,	*Ayier*
This finished off the young men,	Ola ohamala alopwana
Since they started,	*Apacheraka*
This finished off our grandfathers,	Ola ohamala atata
Cunha	*Cunha*
This finished off the young men,	Ola ohamala alopwana
Cunha	*Cunha*
This finished off the young men,	Ola ohamala alopwana
The Company – ay	*Companhia – ay*

While the ultimate moral of the Sena songs is that Sena Sugar, for all its exactions, is a necessary protector, the ultimate moral of the Anguru songs is that the company is an enemy, draining the villages of the men and boys through the agency of state-appointed chiefs. For the up-country peoples there is no choice between the companies and the government: they are all part of the same system.

The question thus arises of what they did with this insight. Armed resistance was impossible due to the lack of centralized leadership, endemic malnutrition and the lack of guns in the area. There is one song, however, which recommends an alternative:[69]

Why didn't you run away?	Wakotutawa – e – e
e – e	*e – e*
(four times)	(four times)
Zefa, girl,	Mwamali Zefa – a
e – e	*e – e*
You've met with Cruz,	Ogumana ni Kruj
e – e	*e – e*

Notes

1. O(ral) T(estimony) Group interview, Madumo village, Luabo, 17 Aug. 1975.
2. A(rquivo do) G(overnador de) Q(uelimane) Maço 90. Report for the *Porto* of Micaune, 1949.
3. For a discussion of obscenity in Sena songs, see Vail and White, '*Paiva*: The History of a Mozambican 'Protest Song', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. V, no. 1 (1978).
4. Sung in Sena by Manuel Dinga, of Nhacatundu, at Missongue village, 31 Oct. 1976.
5. A.G.Q. Maço 53, Report for Bajone, 1947.
6. Sung in Sena by Vittoria Camacho, with the women of Muanavina compound village, Luabo, 24 Aug. 1975. The plantation managers mentioned are Gerard Horst and his successor, Robert Hair. The speaker hesitates before mentioning Hair, and then immediately withdraws her criticism of him.
7. O.T. Group interview, Piriri village, Luabo, 25 Oct. 1976.
8. M. D. D. Newitt, *Portuguese Settlement on the Zambesi* (London, 1973), 138.
9. Sung in Sena by Vittoria Camacho, with the women of Muanavina compound village, Luabo, 24 Aug. 1975.
10. Sung in Sena by Masamanga Anderson, with women of Enhaterre compound, Luabo, 16 Aug. 1975.
11. For example, in versions recorded at Missongue, Muriwa, Cocorico and Maduma villages, and at Muidi, Checanyama and Caoxe compound villages, Luabo, as well as the Luabo river boat landing zone.
12. O. Mannoni, in his *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonialization*, 2nd edn trans. from the French (New York, 1964), 139, makes the point that the people of Madagascar 'were prepared to treat as father and mother governors and administrators not always worthy of that honour', in the context of his discussion of their fear of betrayal and abandonment by the French colonial administration. It is worth noting, and perhaps suggestive as well, that a substantial proportion of Madagascar's people came from the *prazo* area as slaves. Many of these were Podzo and Sena people, those most affected in Mozambique by what Mannoni terms a 'dependency complex', and this points up the assertion made by M. D. D. Newitt that until 'the history of Mozambique is written ... we will know only half of the story of Madagascar ...' M. D. D. Newitt, 'Towards a History of Modern Mozambique', *Rhodesian History*, V (1974), 33.
13. Sung in Sena by Forenza Chambote, Pirira village, Luabo, 5 Aug. 1975.
14. O.T. Group interview, Mopeia, 20 Sept. 1975.
15. For example, in O.T. Group interview, Madumo village, Luabo, 17 Aug. 1975; Group interview, Macuse, 1 Sept. 1977.
16. O.T. Group interview, Muanavina compound village, Luabo, 26 Aug. 1975.
17. S(ena) S(ugar) E(states) A(rchives), Luabo, Mozambique, File 184, 'Native Labour Organisation', details for a report, Luabo, 26 Feb. 1942, unsigned.
18. S.S.E.A. File 153, 'Sugar Sales on the Zambesi', C. B. Hornung to Thurnheer, 8 Apr. 1943; Thurnheer to C. B. Hornung, 8 Nov. 1944 and 8 Oct. 1945; Barros Gomes to Thurnheer, 29 Dec. 1943; Thurnheer to A. D. de Sousa, 13 Nov. 1944.
19. A.G.Q. Maço 25, Report for Macuse, 1944.
20. A.G.Q. Maço 31, Report for Mopeia, 1945.
21. A.G.Q. Maço 97, Report for Mopeia, 1954.

22. A.G.Q. Maço 221, Report for Mopeia, 1967.
23. No. 2 in E. T. Chakanza, 'Nyasa Folk Songs', *African Affairs*, no. 49 (1950), 58–61.
24. ibid, no. 5.
25. Sung in Sena by Mr Nanyindu, Mbangombe village, Nsanje, Malawi, 3 Sept. 1970, in Van Zanten Collection.
26. No. 6 in Chakanza, 'Nyasa Folk Songs'.
27. Sung in Sena at Chitofu village, Nsanje, Malawi, 19 Aug. 1970, in Van Zanten Collection.
28. Sung in Sena by Mbiti Msona, Nkhuche village, Nsange, Malawi, 3 Sept. 1970, in Wim Van Zanten, 'Traditional Malawi Music', unpub. MSS, collection in the University of Malawi Library, Zomba, Malawi (1970–1), no pagination.
29. Sung and played in various versions at Mbonje, Mbangombe and Nkhuche villages, Nsanje, and at Mayele village, Chikwawa, Malawi, in Van Zanten Collection.
30. Sung in Sena by Dolika Davite and Dandela Biliyati, Mbangombe village, Nsanje, Malawi, 26 Aug. 1970, in Van Zanten Collection. See also J. M. Schoffeleers, 'From Socialisation to Personal Enterprise: A History of the Labour Societies in Nsanje District of Malawi, *c* 1891–1972', *Rural Africana*, vol. XX, no. 1 (1973), *passim*.
31. O.T. Group interview, Pirira village, Luabo, 25 Oct. 1976.
32. Personal communication, Luiza Drennon, Nov. 1976.
33. C(ompanhia da) Z(ambesia) A(rchives), Quelimane, Mozambique, Maço 17, Report for Namerrumo Station, 25 Feb. 1918.
34. Personal communication, John Parker, Luabo, 1976.
35. Dr Mendes Correia, 'Politicia da população nas Colonias', *Africa*, vol. XVI (1946), 193.
36. O.T. Group interview, Mopeia, 10 Sept. 1975.
37. Sung in Lomwe by Armena Muhinayula, Helena Souzinho and Casavera Fernando, all from Mulevala, Ile, at Checanyama compound village, Luabo, 30 Aug. 1975.
38. P.R.O. F.O. 371/11989, G. Hornung to Pyke, 15 Apr. 1927, encl. in Pyke to F.O., 19 Apr. 1927.
39. Sung in Chuabo by Paterina João and Palmira Goodbye, of Lower Licungo, at Juncua compound, Marromeu, 2 Sept. 1975.
40. Sung in Sena by Manuel Dinga, Inhacatundu village, at Missongue village, 31 Oct. 1976.
41. Sung in Sena by Egi Fancy and Nthambile Peter, Mbangombe village, Nsanje, Malawi, 26 Aug. 1970, in Van Zanten Collection.
42. Sung in Sena by José Kashkinya, Madumo village, Luabo, 17 Aug. 1975.
43. Sung in Chewa by Zibisana Linkson, Nhamadaue compound, Marromeu, 6 Sept. 1975.
44. O.T. Group Interview, Caoxe compound village, Luabo, 31 Aug. 1975.
45. Sung in Chewa by Adora Guiness and Anifa Chipola, Junoua compound, Marromeu, 7 Sept. 1975. It should be noted that all the Ngoni songs quoted in this section were recorded in Luabo and Marromeu. We have not been able to conduct interviews or record songs in Ngoni territory in Mozambique and Malawi, where attitudes to migrancy may well be different. See, for example, Margaret Reid's comment on Ngoni women's songs in Malawi, 'The poignant refrains of the songs they sang about their absent husbands were more on the theme of



30 Workers at Samacota, Luabo, 1952, dancing to celebrate the repairing of the breach in flood defences

claimed by right all work on the Luabo jetty, and the Podzo, the old inhabitants of *Prazo* Luabo who had the reputation of being country bumpkins, the word *podzo* being used throughout the town as an insult implying dirt and stupidity. Last of all in the whole chain and still despised by everyone, even by the Podzos, were the majority of field-workers, the Anguru migrants from Ile, Nhamarroi, Alto Moloque and

Maganja da Costa. Living half in and half outside the system this heterogeneous group was the only one with alternative loyalties and commitments.

Within this stratified hierarchy of power, pride and jealousy, what political consciousness existed was expressed invariably in the form of the protest of one group at its exclusion from the privileges granted to that immediately above it in the hierarchy. We noted earlier the protest of Saboya Ramos in 1937 on behalf of the white Portuguese staff on the subject of housing, club membership and the general unfriendliness of the English. In 1956 the issue was parodied within the coloured community when a group of young Portuguese-speaking coloureds applied to join the *Clube Sporting*. The application was rejected by the Demararan president on the grounds that there was a 'need to maintain standards'.[21] Two years later the African Association of Zambesia complained to the Sena Sugar management that coloureds and *assimilados* at Luabo were being treated 'like natives', being excluded from the *Clube Sporting* and having their wages paid through the same window as ordinary labourers.[22] The African workers were, of course, excluded from the town facilities but they had their own resentments. While the Sena would accept an Ngoni *capitão*, they refused to work under an Anguru, while labourers from Micaune complained bitterly about living and working alongside the Podzo who were still regarded as unclean hippo-hunters.[23] Wage differentials were a constant irritant. Sena wanted the same wages as Ngoni and Anguru the same as Sena, while everyone at Luabo wanted to be paid at the Marromeu rates. As late as 1971, when the issue of equal pay for Marromeu and Luabo arose yet again and Sena Sugar feared it might have to raise Luabo wages by 91.00 *esc.* monthly, the solution was as it had always been:

> Long before we bow to the mutterings of the labour force regarding the difference in wages we should try to separate them by tribe, which of course must minimize the problem.[24]

Eventually the situation in Luabo became simpler. The system was more complicated than political or economic considerations strictly demanded and by the 1950s Sena Sugar was in any case out of step with the law. In September 1958 an indignant report in *A Voz da Zambesia* about the treatment of *assimilado* members of a visiting football team provoked the Governor to intervene.[25] Sena Sugar was forced to open a new club, the *Recreativa*, which eventually superseded the *Clube Sporting*, and to build a fresh housing estate for coloureds and *assimilados*.[26] Meanwhile, all seven of the outlying compounds at Luabo were becoming centres of substantial villages, in which the wives and families of current and retired workers, who could not be housed in the compounds, took advantage of the facilities offered. Though some of them, such as Enhaterre and Muanavina, remained predominantly Anguru, and although Sena Sugar's policy remained to separate

a rail link between Marromeu and the Trans-Zambesia Railway at Inhaminga so as to dispense with expensive port labour at Chinde.[50]

Even so something remained of the old problem of recruitment methods and of the treatment of labour with officials still existing who were prepared to turn a blind eye to abuses. The most acute section of the whole I.L.O. *Report* throws some light on why this was so:

> In the case of territories in the stage of economic and social development of Portuguese Africa, the effective application of the laws and regulations implementing the provisions of an international labour convention presents certain further problems of a special character. Great distances and imperfect communications; the existence of mining and agricultural concessions covering large areas where, besides governmental authority, there exists in practice the very marked and active influence of the company holding the concession; backwardness of certain parts of the population, characteristic of the less accessible regions of the African continent, which makes it difficult to gauge how clearly they understand their rights under the law or their terms of employment or are in a position to exercise any real personal freedom in view of the constant pressure upon them of habit and customs and an ingrained habit of obedience to both governmental and indigenous authorities; the barrier to intercourse represented by the lack of any considerable knowledge of African languages by either governmental officials or the senior of executive personnel in industry, transport, mining and agriculture; the difficulty of having any real understanding of what is happening in the African mind in the absence of a substantial African administrative cadre in either government or industry; all these are among the elements in the problem of law enforcement which may well make it difficult for the government to gauge with accuracy how completely its intentions are being implemented in practice.[51]

To this concise analysis must be added two further points. First, that in spite of the improved wages and working conditions of the 1960s Mozambique plantation labour remained among the worst paid in the world. Even the rise to 15.00 *esc.* daily for agricultural workers and 18.00 *esc.* daily for industrial workers enforced in 1971 was not enough to eliminate all compulsion.[52] The equating of cheap labour with forced labour in an artificially closed society remained partly valid right up to 1974: Quelimane district was still the companies' *prazo*. Secondly, that the habits created by centuries of Portuguese rule in Zambezia, the assumptions about the conduct appropriate to power, could not be altered overnight. The style of the area's history remained tenacious. In 1970 officers of the Portuguese army in Massingiri complained to the civil administration in Quelimane about the causes of migration of Africans from Chief Tengane's territory to Malawi. They ran away because they were being compelled to work for Lopes e Irmão for low pay and bad food; sometimes, after the day's work the overseers refused to mark their labour tickets, but if they complained about this to the *chefe do posto* they were beaten on the hand with the *palmatoria*.[53] The abuse, the complaint, the reaction: the pattern was as old as the company system.

Meanwhile the overseer at Sena Sugar's Luabo jetty, Luis Carneiro, was notorious for his treatment of the loaders, using a stick and even a *sjambok* to get the work done. Carneiro boasted not only that he could not be harmed by witchcraft, but that complaints to the company management or to the *chefe do posto* could equally do him no harm.[54] One of the present writers was in Luabo when he died in 1970, the rumour running through the town that he had begged forgiveness on his deathbed for his treatment of 'his boys', and the entire Sena Sugar work-force took a holiday, killing goats and brewing beer to celebrate the event. Five years later the song which accompanied the dancing was still being sung:[55]

Karinyero,
He's left his fun behind.
On the jetty,
He's left his fun behind.

Karinyero
Sia goso
Pagombe
Sia goso

As late as August 1974 an official enquiry was ordered into the conduct of Teofilo do Nascimento Figueiredo, the Administrator of Morumbala. The enquiry, coming three months after the Lisbon coup, was something of a post-mortem. Caetano's government had tried with little success to set up a series of fortified villages in this border area and Chief Suze had resigned rather than continue to serve under *Piri-piri* or 'the hot one' as Figueiredo was known locally. He was found guilty of various abuses. He had embezzled money intended as payment for public works, had paid his *capatazes* and *cantoneiros* only 200.00 *esc.* monthly instead of the minimum 20.00 *esc.* per day and had sold off various government properties for personal profit. He had used the *palmatoria* indiscriminately, not only against ordinary villagers but even against four chiefs and twelve headmen and against his own guards, interpreters, *capatazes* and domestic servants in the administration. These punishments, which in one case had amounted to 24 strokes on each hand, were inflicted for ridiculous offences – the interpreter was beaten because he suffered from asthma and two of the headmen were struck for failing to attend a meeting – Raposo while suffering from snake-bite and Gumane while at his father's funeral. Finally, he had arrested and detained people illegally. Africans were imprisoned for losing their identity cards or falling behind with tax payments and then were compelled to work on the roads for periods of up to 97 days with no pay and little food. The investigator, Dr Antonio Estrela Baptista, recorded his 'impression' that Figueiredo had 'resolved his labour problems by sending out to look for people who had not yet paid their taxes, and putting them to work on the roads or in the service of the administration, forgetting about them because they stayed there many months, and forgetting also to pay them'. Dozens of Africans had been detained in this manner, including visitors from Marromeu, Mutarara and Lugella, one administrative guard alone being in charge of a group of 93 tax-defaulters, all working without pay. Where even these

months and unlike workers elsewhere they were at least being paid. So it continued, the companies' position becoming weekly more precarious. Eventually the Bank of Mozambique was forced by Frelimo to put up credit, and in order to persuade the workers that they had to earn such trust the administration 'presented to the workers a veteran fighter of Frelimo who explained the importance this company had in exercising the functions of economic development'.[59]

The companies could not be ignored and the historical effects of their presence could not be undone. But nor could their inefficiency and their dependence on cheap labour be altered overnight; and where, as with Sena Sugar, that dependence included protected markets in Portugal and within the over-arching imperial economy, independence rendered the problem unmanageable. At Luabo, sixteen days after independence, the Frelimo Administrator had a meeting with Sena Sugar's management,

> who met me to present the problem that the workers do not complete the tasks which are given to them; that the workers start their tasks late, and they leave their place of work without giving satisfaction in any way; they go off, and they don't return to work; that the overseers complete the work cards of workers who have not finished their work; that the company does not have money so that if the banks do not lend money they will not be able to pay even a month's salary to the workers. These are the tricks of the company to undermine the economy of the country, we find them to be tricks because these problems arose only now after national independence, before which the workers worked very well and completed their tasks.[60]

Despite the Luabo Administrator's resentment at this lecture he was forced to act as though he agreed with every word. In September he recorded with glee the Governor of Zambezia's challenge in a further meeting with Sena Sugar that 'We have fought colonialism so that we can now fight capitalism in Mozambique, and we are ready!' But he spent the month dealing with problems of 'indiscipline' among the workers – cases of tasks not being completed, of *capatazes* being beaten up, of days missed and tickets sold to cover up for absences.[61] Lacking the powers of the old Administrator, he was forced to do by persuasion what had previously been done by compulsion, and the message that unlike other companies Sena Sugar was still paying wages was not a reassuring one. Inevitably a gap opened between the aims of the revolution and the expectations of the local people. Independence was, of course, celebrated in Luabo with great enthusiasm, but it was an enthusiasm based on some odd assumptions. As one up-to-date version of the *Paiva* song put it:[62]

Forença zone,	Zona Forença
Machuane zone,	Zona Machuane
Secretary Georgio,	Secretario Jolijo
Secretary Luis Gomes	Secretario Luis Gomes

Ay – ay
Paiva, young man
Ay – ay
Paiva is diabolical
Ay – ay
Now we have escaped
We used to be tied with rope
Paiva, I've killed his money for him, his penis!

Ay – ay
Father,
Ay – ay
I'm drunk
Ay – ay
Father, I've drunk koropu,
I'm drunk,
Paiva, I've killed his money for him, his penis!

Forença zone,
Machuane zone,
Secretary Georgio,
Secretary Luis Basto

Ay – ay
Paiva mwanawe
Ay – ay
Paiva ndioyipa
Ay – ay
Chinchino tapulumuka
Takamangwa na nkabala kunduli
Paiva ndampera dinyero ache nsondo wache

Ay – ay
Baba – ay
Ay – ay
Ndalezera – ay
Ay – ay
Baba ndamwa koropu
Ndalezera – ay
Paiva ndampera dinyero ache nsondo wache

Zona Forença
Zona Machuane
Secretario Jolijo
Secretario Luis Basto

The 'zones' to which the singer refers are the new administrative subdivisions, and the 'secretaries' the new party officials. In this version of the song *Paiva* has been overthrown by Frelimo but the flatly unheroic statement 'Now we have escaped' acknowledges implicitly how little the people of the area are responsible. Other songs to celebrate the occasion praise Samora as *patrão* – as though Samora were just another *prazo*-holder, but one able to offer more than any previous benefactor. Hence the emphasis on drinking – the word 'koropu' means cane-spirit, a drink Frelimo, like the Portuguese, is trying to stamp out. Hence the belief that there is no longer any need to work, for Frelimo 'is letting us rest'.

> The government used to cheat us. We used to work, but got paid very little. If you complained that the money was too little, you'd be put in prison. There you can work for six months, and you don't get money or anything. Now Frelimo has taken the country. Now we are resting. The one who is giving us time to rest is Frelimo.[63]

In 1974 the proportion of taxes collected was 32 per cent and in December 1976 the Luabo Administrator noted sorrowfully that 'in comparison with last year when 10433 taxes were collected, this year there were only 3274, a difference of 7169, in spite of explanations of the purpose of the tax'.[64]

Other areas experienced similar problems, particularly over labour

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures