Catarina Dutilh Novaes sobre “Against ‘Reason Supremacism’ in Democratic Politics”
A próxima sessão do ArgLab Research Colloquium estará a cargo de Catarina Dutilh Novaes (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), que fará uma apresentação intitulada “Against ‘Reason Supremacism’ in Democratic Politics”. A sessão será conduzida em inglês e terá lugar no dia 7 de fevereiro, pelas 16h, na sala SE1 do Colégio Almada Negreiros e online, via Zoom.
Para participar na sessão via Zoom, por favor contacte Maria Grazia Rossi através do e-mail mgrazia.rossi@fcsh.unl.pt.
Este evento faz parte do ArgLab Research Colloquium organizado por Maria Grazia Rossi, Giulia Terzian e Gloria Andrada no Laboratório de Argumentação, Cognição e Linguagem do Instituto de Filosofia da NOVA (IFILNOVA) e terá lugar no âmbito das atividades do grupo de investigação Filosofia e argumentação na sociedade (PAIS), coordenado por Dina Mendonça (ArgLab/IFILNOVA).
RESUMO
Influential theorists of deliberative democracy such as Habermas and Rawls view rational argumentation as the main, and perhaps even as the only, legitimate means of deliberation in democratic societies. This general stance can be (provocatively) described as ‘reason supremacism’. However, this focus on rational argumentation tends to have exclusionary effects and to present barriers for participation especially for those at the margins in societies with great power discrepancies. In particular, when oppressed groups argue (rationally) against their oppression, more often than not their arguments remain ignored in the dominant public spheres, at least until they do something sufficiently ‘shocking’ so as to attract significant (often negative) attention. But interventions in public discourse that do not fit the ‘rational’ mold are then often criticized and sidelined for being of the ‘wrong kind’.
In view of these phenomena, political theorist Iris Marion Young has famously defended a more pluralistic conception of political discourse. Drawing on Young and reflecting on the purported differences between rational argumentation and propaganda, I will argue that rational argumentation should be but one type of discourse (albeit an important one) among others in broader political conversations, thus rejecting reason supremacism. To illustrate this thesis, I will draw on a prominent public debate that took place in the Netherlands over the last decades on the folk character known as ‘Black Pete’ (Zwarte Piet). The success of the anti-racism activism against the racialized, colonialist character of Black Pete illustrates the strength of a pluralistic approach to political discourse.